TRANSPARENCY AND INDETERMINACY IN THE
LIBERAL CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES
William A. Edmundson*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................

II.

III.

IV.
V.

THE

CLS

557

ATTACK ON THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF THE

RULE OF LAW ..........................................
THE "PROBLEMATIC" OF LIBERAL LEGALISM .............
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE LIBERAL RULE OF LAW ......
THE INCOHERENCE OF LEGAL DOCTRINE ................

561
563
567
574

A. The "Patchwork" Thesis ...........................
1. A Coherentist Answer to Patchwork? ...........
2. The "Standard" Argument for Patchwork ......
B. The "Duck-Rabbit" Thesis .........................
C. The "Truncation" Thesis ..........................
D. Doctrinal Incoherence and the "Cluster" Thesis ..

575
576
580
581
584
585
593
597
601

VI. RELAXING THE LOCKEAN STRICTURE ....................
VII. Is TRANSPARENCY DISPENSABLE? ........................
VIII. CONCLUSION ...........................................
I.

INTRODUCTION

Proponents of mainstream, liberal' Anglo-American legal theory and proponents of Critical Legal Studies (CLS for short) have
generally been dismissive and overtly scornful in their evaluations
* Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law; B.A., Antioch College; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Duke University. The author
would like to thank Andrew Altman, Steven Burton, David Gray Carlson, Angelo
Corlett, Michael Hoffheimer, Ken Kress, Paul Milich, and Eric Segall for their helpful
responses to drafts of this Article.
1 I mean "liberal" in the classical sense, to refer to a broad philosophical tradition
including figures as diverse as Kant, Jefferson, Mill and Rousseau, rather than to any
contemporary political agenda, although the latter is the popular usage. A liberal in
my sense may or may not have voted for Walter Mondale, and may or may not identify
herself as politically conservative. But my terminology is also compatible with Samuel
Scheffler's thesis that political liberalism and philosophical liberalism are not totally
discrete. See Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. Aiv. 299 (1992) (arguing that liberalism in both its
political and its philosophical forms is characteristically skeptical of the moral concept
of personal desert). Mark Kelman has noted that many Critical Legal Studies scholars
use "'liberalism' [as] a very loose term for the dominant postfeudal beliefs held across
all but the left and right fringes of the political spectrum." MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRncAL LEGAL STUDIEs 2 (1987). My terminology is not so broad.
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of each other's work.2 Luckily, there are signs that a serious and
measured engagement has begun, which will continue until the
real issues dividing the disputants have been clarified and, if this is
not beyond hope, resolved.
My chief stalking horse in this essay will be Andrew Altman,
whose recent book, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique,3 is (as
advertised) a "comprehensive, systematic, and closely argued exploration of the deepest issues" dividing CLS and its liberal counterparts.4 Altman's book was eagerly awaited by those familiar with
his influential 1986 article, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and
Dworkin,5 which detailed the difficulties CLS poses for Ronald
Dworkin's theory of law and concluded by insisting that "[i] t is well
past the time when legal philosophers can justifiably ignore the
body of work associated with the Critical Legal Studies
movement."6
By 1990, however, when his book appeared, Altman had decided that, although CLS had done liberal theory a valuable service
by forcing it to clarify-and in some respects to modify-its commitments, in the end CLS had done no "serious damage" to the
basic structure of liberal theory.7 In that same year, legal theorist
Ken Kress, in his comprehensive article, Legal Indeterminacy,8 found
CLS to combine "good legal analysis, not qualitatively different
from traditional legal scholarship,"9 with an unwarranted
irrationalism.
I will evaluate the terms of peace that Altman, Kress and other
liberal theorists have offered CLS. I will not attempt to defend
CLS-many of the extreme positions that have been associated
with it seem to me to be untenable-but rather I will try to evaluate
liberalism's understanding of the ground it need not yield to CLS
as well as the ground it reckons it may safely abandon. My main
conclusions are the following.
First, I conclude that the liberal conception of the rule of
2 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 271-75 (1986) (CLS may be "a new
mystification in service of undisclosed political goals"); Elizabeth Mensch, The History
of MainstreamLegal Thought, in THE POLrrIcs OF LAw 18 & n.* (David Kairys ed., 1982)
(dismissing Rawls and Ronald Dworkin as "vastly overrated").
3 ANDREW ALTMAN, CRmcAL LEGAL STUDIEs: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990).
4 Id. at 9.
5 Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, CriticalLegal Studies, andDworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205 (1986).
6 Id. at 235.
7 ALmiAN, supra note 3, at 9.
8 Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. Rv. 283 (1989).
9 Id. at 328.
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law-and its ancillary distinction between law and politics-has not
been secured against certain lines of argument first advanced by
the Legal Realists and now urged by CLS. These lines of argument
purport to show that law is, to some significant degree, indeterminate. The general form of liberal response to the "indeterminacy"
challenge is to confess that many legal rules are in fact indeterminate, but to avoid the CLS conclusion that the rule of law is a hoax
by appealing to "background" conventions, "secondary rules of
meaning" and to coherentist renderings of legal truth. I argue that
these appeals-those of Altman and Kress, in particular-do not
make out any viable alternative to Dworkin's account, which cures
indeterminacy by promoting woollier, nonrule maxims of judicial
reasoning (called "principles") to the status of law.
Dworkin's appeal to "principles" is not itself a cure to the perceived indeterminacy problem because, as Hart and others (including Altman himself) have insisted, the weights and priorities such
principles bear are not settied. Dworkin therefore insists that there
exists, by dint of the possibility of ideally perspicacious moral reasoning, a uniquely best moral resolution of any legal issue and that
that is the law. I point out the irony in Dworkin's position: liberalism, which is born in recognition that reasonable people may disagree on a wide range of moral issues,1 0 is driven to base the very
legitimacy of its adjudicative institutions on an implausible "one
right answer" thesis.' 1
Second, I argue that the link between liberalism's conception
of the rule of law and its theory of political legitimacy is weaker
than is commonly supposed. The liberal theory of political legitimacy rests on what I will call the "transparency principle," which
requires that state power be exercised only on grounds that every
citizen can reasonably accept.12 The transparency principle is one
10 The dominant strain of liberal thinking, exemplified by John Rawls, disavows
appeals to moral truth and to any "comprehensive" theory of the good for mankind.
See, e.g., JOHN RAwLS, PoLTrrIcAL LIBERAUSM (1993). An undercurrent has emerged,
however, which rejects such scruples as misguided. See, e.g., William Galston, Defending Liberalism, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 621 (1982).
11 One interpreter of Dworkin, Stephen Guest, has denied that Dworkin holds a
'one right answer" thesis, and has argued that Dworkin, rightly understood, should
instead be taken to have issued a "prove there's no right answer" challenge to the
moral skeptic. See STEPHEN GuEsr, RONALD DWORKIN 137-47 (1991). Guest's interpretation overlooks the fact that it has Dworkin at least making the implicit claim that the
risk of nonpersuasion lies with his opponents and not with him. See RICHARD GASKINS,
BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DIScouRsE 171-78 (1992).
12 See, for example, Rawls's "liberal principle of legitimacy":
[Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of
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that both liberals and CLS share. In developing a theory of adjudication, however, liberals have relied upon a seeming, but illusory,
corollary of the transparency principle.
In liberal treatments of adjudication and the "rule of law," the
common supposition is that the state can legitimately exercise its
vast, coercive powers against the individual only if it does so on the
basis of preexisting legal rights and duties. This stricture, traceable to
John Locke, is the key component of the liberal's conception of
the rule of law. Adherence to this Lockean stricture explains liberalism's sensitivity to the CLS claim that law is significantly, if not
wholly, indeterminate. But, I argue, the Lockean stricture is unnecessarily narrow, and is not entailed by the transparency principle. Therefore, the liberal response to the "indeterminacy crisis " "
has rested on a mistake.
Third, and finally, I conclude that the CLS insistence upon
opening law to politics is best viewed not as a programmatic appendage to its attack on mainstream legal theory, but rather as the
centerpiece of a proposed alternative conception of the transparency principle. Liberals are drawn to a rationalistic conception
of transparency, according to which the state's legitimacy depends
upon its basic structure being acceptable to an ideally reasonable
agent. The Lockean stricture serves to assure that the legitimacy
conferred at this abstract level is transmitted to concrete adjudicative outcomes by means of rigorous legal reasoning that leaves no
"logical room for judicial shenanigans."' 4
CLS, in contrast, is attracted to a voluntaristic conception,
which insists upon the openness of state processes to the participation of actual people. Judging, for CLS, cannot be legitimated by
the abstract, liberal "transmission belt" mechanism. 5 Although
liberalism and CLS have differing understandings of the Enlightenment ideal of transparency, they are both committed to that ideal
as essential to the legitimacy of state power. Both liberals and their
CLS critics should realize that their debate has really been about
which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.
RAwLS, supranote 10, at 217. See generallyJeremy Waldron's excellent discussion of
transparency, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127 (1987).
13 The term is Lawrence Solum's. See Lawrence Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:
CritiquingCriticalDogma, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 462, 462 (1987).
14 The phrase is Steven Burton's. See STEVEN BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND LEGAL REASONING 170 (1985).
15 The term is Mark Tushnet's. See Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: A Political
History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1527 (1991).
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their competing conceptions of legitimacy, and only incidentally
about the degree of indeterminacy in the law.
II.

THE CLS ATTACK UPON THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF "RULE
OF LAW"

CLS challenges the rule of law-a recurring theme of liberal
legal thought-as a myth. The pedigree of the idea of the rule of
law is long: reaching back to the ancients and tracing forward
through Locke, Hobhouse, Hayek, Fuller, Dworkin and Raz.16 The
liberal conception of the rule of law insists on the Lockean idea
that preexisting legal rights and duties are the only legitimate basis of
state authority. Without such a basis, state power impermissibly infringes on individual autonomy. With such a basis, state power can
be seen by the individual as flowing ultimately from a source whose
justness she can reasonably accept, and whose bearing on her can
reasonably be anticipated.
For liberalism, the rule of law is an essential element of political legitimacy in conditions of pluralism-that is, in conditions
that involve widespread dissensus among reasonable people about
the good life. The "fact of pluralism,"' 7 combined with the demands of political legitimacy, require that there be a distinctively
legal, i.e., nonmoral, form of reasoning. For, unless there were
some limit to the permissible forms of legal discourse, judging
would not be reliably free of the influence of controversial conceptions of the good, in which case these exercises of state power
would in effect coercively enforce conceptions of the good to
which some citizens would not freely assent. 8 Judging would, in
other words, be nothing more than the waging of politics by other,
coercive, means. Although moral reasoning of all types may have
16 See, e.g.,JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OFJUSTnCE 23543 (1971); RAWLs, supra note 10,

at 23140. In the former, Rawls rather uncritically adopts Lon Fuller's account of law;
in the latter, he rather uncritically adopts Ronald Dworkin's. See also David Carlson,
Liberal Philosophy's Troubled Relation to the Rule of Law, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 257 (1993).
17 The term is John Rawls's. SeeJohn Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7
OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987).
18 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 23; John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in 3
THE TANNER LECrURES ON HUMAN VALUES 3, 17 (S. McMurrin ed., 1982); Ronald
127 (Stuart Hampshire ed.,
Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALr

1978). Recently, some liberals have taken the "perfectionist" position that the state
may permissibly advance a controversial conception of the good life. SeeJosEPH RAZ,
THE MORALrrv OF FREEDOM 134-62 (1986); Galston, supra note 10; Stephen
Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARv. L. REv.

1350 (1991). This issue is detachable from those I explore here; a perfectionist liberal may have just as great and perhaps even a greater need to secure the law/politics
distinction.
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to be tolerated in the political arena, 9 once the political process
has made law, that law's form-"congealed politics" 2° though it

be-takes on an objective existence that can be perceived by all,
regardless of their personal political or moral viewpoints; and can
be accepted by all as flowing from the just operation of acceptable
institutions.
21
Against this background, CLS has mounted two main prongs
of attack upon the liberal conception of the rule of law:
CLS Prong 1 : As essential as politically neutral legal reasoning
is to the liberal rule of law, it is nonetheless impossible. Legal reasoning is necessarily either indeterminate or determinate only by
grace of the steadying influence of controversial normative principles, which in turn give play to judges' subjective intuitions. Thus,
the liberal law/politics distinction must collapse under its own conceptual weight.
CLS Prong 2: Conflicting but nonetheless authoritative legal
principles exist in all departments of legal doctrine. 22 Thus, legal
reasoning is radically indeterminate, for in many (or perhaps
most-even all) cases, outcomes can be justified only by reference
to an undetermined choice between conflicting doctrinal principles. Because judges are always free to choose which of these principles to effectuate, they either choose arbitrarily or (more often)
they consult a wider, extralegal sense of what is most appropriate.
Thus, in all actually existing liberal states there is rule, not of law,
but of politics.
There are deep divisions within CLS that bear upon how this
19 Some liberals would sharply curtail the role of moral reasoning in purely political dialogue. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JusTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12
(1980); see generally MICHAEL PERRY, LovE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991) (criticizing Ackerman and others).
20 1 borrow the term "congealed politics" from David Gray Carlson, see supra note
16, at 20, but Carlson disavows authorship.
21 Altman identifies a third prong, which I will simply describe: The liberal rule of
law is, for CLS, but an instance of a more general view of human nature, according to
which human possibilities are limited by some sort of "deep structure." But CLS argues that, just as "deep structure" theories of human nature falsely reify some one or
other partial picture of the human past, so also it is fetishism to think that law can
constrain events or, in particular, the exercise of state and social power. This fetishism is not only false but is itself disempowering, for it tends to represent legal reform
as a foolhardy attempt to contravene the deep structures of human association.
22 Altman reads this CLS claim as asserting the existence of "pairs of fundamentally incompatible norms.., in virtually all departments of law." ALTMAN, supra note
3, at 14. As I point out more fully infra, text accompanying notes 111-15, his insistence upon contradictory "pairs" within legal "departments"-in contrast to conflicting but not contradictory clusters of doctrines that often defy departmental
boundaries-leads Altman to underestimate the vulnerability of the liberal position.
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attack is to be carried through. There are radical and moderate
strains of CLS thinking. Radical CLS is "deconstructionist,"2 3 i.e.,
antiobjectivist about law and social institutions; for it, meanings are
unstable, words are "empty vessels." 24 Thus, legal reasoning is indeterminate in all possible legal worlds and takes what form it has
from the reasoning subject. Moderate CLS rejects deconstructionism; words do have "core" meanings but interpretation, shaped by
the subject, is necessary to render a decision in the many gaps and
peripheral areas of law. Law does have an objective structure, one
that is a function of flawed, individualistic ethics.
Altman's overall strategy is to take advantage of the divisions
within CLS. The deconstructionist account of language and social
reality upon which radical CLS rests is untenable, he argues. Moderate CLS turns out to be sound on the issue of meaning but assimilable to liberalism. 25 Altman's view is that the necessary work can
be done without addressing the CLS view that the "rule of law"
doctrine masks oppressive politics and perpetuates injustice. He
declines the occasion to explore the CLS position that illegitimate
power relations pervade liberal democracies because to do so
26
would lead too "far afield" into "normative political philosophy."
Altman's thesis is thus that the liberal rule of law is not a myth even
ifexisting social power relations are illegitimate, and that the CLS
critique can be satisfactorily digested without engaging it in debate
on that point.
III.

THE "PROBLEMATIC" OF LIBERAL LEGALISM

An acute problem with the liberal model, as Altman points
out, is that contemporary liberal democracies seem routinely to violate it. Anglo-American law abounds in vague terms: adjudicators
peek at the normative merits of the legal disputes they are called
upon to decide; bureaucrats legislate. Indeterminacy seems rife
and the reality of the modem administrative state has thrown the
liberal camp into confusion. Some liberals, like Hayek, have condemned the administrative state as fundamentally hostile to liberty
and the rule of law. Others, like H.L.A. Hart, have tried to reconcile modem trends with the rule of law, conceding that there are
23 On deconstruction, see CHRISTOPHER NoRs, DERRIDA (1987), RUDOLPHE
GASCHiE, THE TAIN oF -E MIRROR (1986),JAcQuEs DERRIDA, LIMITED, INC. (1988).
24 The term is Clare Dalton's. Clare Dalton, An Essay on the Deconstruction of Con-

tract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 1002, 1002, 1008-10 (1985).
25 See, e.g., ALTmAN,supra note 3,at 20-21; see alsoJohn Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 ILARv. L. REv. 332 (1986).
26 ALTmAN, supra note 3, at 15-16.
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variant areas of law, while accounting indeterminacy to the nature
of language and rules and even embracing it as a source of desirable flexibility.2 7 There have been still other liberal responses. Ronald Dworkin has taken the line that no significant indeterminacy
exists, but on his account it is eliminated by admitting substantive
moral judgment into the law.28
For Altman, the Hart-Dworkin dispute involves two points that
must be settled before attempting a liberal critique of CLS. The
first is whether the legal authority of a norm is ultimately a matter
of convention. The second is whether there is significant indeterminacy in the law. Hart says Yes on both counts; Dworkin says No
on the second but cannot (Altman argues) say No on the first. Altman adopts and defends the Yes answers.
For Hart, the existence of a rule within a population is constituted by the existence of a behavioral regularity that is combined
with a critical attitude, which expresses itself in criticism, demands
for conformity, and acknowledgement of the justness of such demands. Law is a union of primary rules, which directly bear upon
conduct, and secondary rules, which directly bear upon rules themselves and only indirectly upon citizen conduct. The existence of
the secondary rules distinctive of legal systems is constituted by certain behavior of an official class principally composed of lawyers.
Thus, for Hart, where conscientious judges disagree, there is no
unique right answer to the question, What is the law on this
point?-there is indeterminacy. Hart's "most basic argument" for
indeterminacy is this: Law is convention; thus, gaps exist in the law
29
wherever, and because, gaps in conventional agreement exist.
For Hart, a judicial decision that fills a gap is legislation.
In Dworkin's view, Hart falsely restricts law to settled law, i.e.,
rules conventionally agreed to by officials. "Hard" cases, i.e., cases
that turn on unsettled legal issues, are decided by consulting the
"soundest theory of law" (or, in Dworkin's later, Law's Empire terminology, the "best constructive interpretation of law")."0 The soundest theory is the one that scores highest on some measure of both
27 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 121-32 (1961).
28 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 48-65
(R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977).

29 Hart admits that the "open texture" argument won't establish indeterminacy if
other tie-breaking devices exist within the legal system but outside the legal rule in
question; but because tiebreakers are themselves rules, his general argument goes
through. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 7-8 (1983); see also

ALTmAN, supra note 3, at 33.
30 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 35 n.19.
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its "fit" with the body of settled law and its normative soundness.
This process will necessarily involve weighting, and because the
weights assigned will be controversial, so will the resulting legal
judgment. But, for Dworkin, controversy does not entail indeterminacy. A perfect tie at the theoretical level would create indeterminacy, but such ties are so rare as to be negligible. Thus, the rule
of law indeed means that no state coercion is legitimate unless it is
authorized by preexisting legal rights and duties, which-for Dworkin-is to say that it is authorized by settled law or the soundest
theory thereof.
Altman's assessment is that Dworkin must concede that the
soundest theory of law yields principles of law only because officials
conventionally regard it as doing so."1 A concession that the authority of the soundest theory has a conventional basis would not
itself require Dworkin to admit wide indeterminacy; but for Dworkin to sustain the claim that there is only modest indeterminacy he
must show that appeals to the soundest theory cure indeterminacy
where the settled law runs out, and he must show that what judges
do in "hard" cases is best described as working out and applying
the soundest theory-but, Altman contends, this latter claim is not
so. Rather, Altman argues that Rolf Sartorius is right that logicalfit
alone is the governing judicial convention in hard cases, not consultation of the soundest theory of law.32
For Sartorius, a judge's duty is to maximize coherence, not to
achieve moral correctness. Dworkin is right that ethical soundness
widely is given effect, Altman tells us, but wrong to hold that there
is a convention as to whether and when ethical soundness is to be
weighed. Judges themselves generally deny that ethical soundness
can ever properly compete with or be balanced against fit. For example, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,33 the court seemed to ignore settled precedent contrary to its holding that privity of
contract is not an element of a remote purchaser's personal injury
suit for damages caused by a negligently built vehicle. Although
Judge Cardozo relied on ethical considerations, he presented the
result as determined by fit; and the dissent faulted the majority not
for the ethics it imported but for importing ethics at all. Dworkin
31 Id. at 39. Altman argues that an alternative not open to Dworkin is to say that
the very nature of law gives legal force to the soundest theory. Dworkin cannot say
this because he concedes that law might by convention have been restricted to settled
law-a possibility that could not exist if the soundest theory were law proprio vigore.
32 See id. at 41 (citing RoLF SARTo~ius, INDIrWDUAL CONDUCT AND SocIAL NoRMs
(1975)).
33 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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cannot account, in Altman's view, for the persistence of the idea
that ethics should not count, or for the fact that courts are widely
criticized for importing ethics even as they protest that they are
not.
The best view, Altman thinks, is that fit is the reigning, conventionally entrenched test, although when fit fails some courts consult ethics while denying doing so, some do ethics and admit it,
e.g., under the rubric of "public policy," and others insist that fit is
as far as they can go. In sum, "Dworkinite reasoning is . . . not
conventional[,] but inherently controversial"" 4-controversial, that
is, not only in its outcomes but controversial as an admissible mode
of reasoning. Altman thus assumes that Sartorian reasoning is
both a genuine and a less controversial alternative to Dworkinite
legal reasoning.
Altman concedes that "indeterminacy is a significant phenomenon in our legal culture.""5 The major source of this indeterminacy is the "breakdown of the convention prescribing decisions
and reasoning having a maximum coherence [or best fit] with the
settled law." 6 The breakdown of the best fit convention is especially likely to occur in cases in which "conflicting principles of decision fit the law more or less equally well . . ."7 Where this
occurs, some judges will repair to critical morality, some to legislative intent, and some would stick with fit to find the silly millimeter's worth of fit difference. Even in easy cases the "fit" convention
fails when "far and away the morally better principle" is contra.3 "
Altman thus defends a model that has judges follow a "best fit"
convention-except where morality has a much better answerand, if fit fails, follow a convention prescribing fit with "some substantial part of settled law."3 9
Conceding indeterminacy does not automatically mean abandoning the law/politics distinction, but as Altman points out it
raises the question whether CLS is right to reject it. The liberal
law/politics distinction means that interpreting the law must be insulated from any fresh assessment of the normative merits of the
34

ALTmAN, supra note 3, at 45.

35
36

Id. at 48.

Id.

Id. Kelsen and Greenawalt argue that even if law fails to dictate an outcome, it
dictates the "frame" in which the outcome and the reasoning for it must be located.
See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAw 351-52 (1967); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and
JudicialDecision: The Elusive Questfor the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 359,
382 (1975). Of course, then the issue becomes: How to characterize the frame?
38 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 49.
37

39 Id.
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contending views whose clash creates the law.4" Only in this way
can the rule of law rise above normative controversy and be assured
of enforcing preexisting, not post-facto, legal rights and duties.
But if legal doctrine is inherently "gappy," if opposing principles
are always at hand, and if judicial conventions are porous, liberalism must show how law can raise itself above politics in the way
the Lockean stricture requires.
IV.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE LIBERAL RULE OF LAW

Altman understands the first prong of the CLS critique to be a
charge that in a pluralistic society the rule of law is a conceptual
impossibility. In particular, the liberal conception of the rule of
law, as a corollary of its commitment to the Lockean stricture, requires that judges bracket substantive moral controversy once the
democratic process has declared a rule by enacting a "formula
upon which opposing social and political forces have come to
rest."4 1 This "legal neutrality" is what is meant by the separation of
law and politics.4 2 Unless judges bracket substantive moral controversy once a rule has been declared, adjudication becomes an exercise of coercion not grounded in preexisting legal rights and
duties.4 3
Legal neutrality is threatened by Unger's "antinomy of rules
and values," which insists that an assessment of competing normative visions is inevitable in ranking alternative readings of the relevant authoritative materials. For CLS, if adjudication in the liberal
40 This corresponds to what Roberto Unger calls "legal formalism," viz., the view
that "interpretation of [legal] rules should not depend on any fresh assessment of the
soundness of the conceptions of the right and the good that compete in the political
arena." ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRIcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1 (1986).
41 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).
42 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 76-77, Joseph Raz argues for what he calls the "sources
thesis"-viz., that "the content of the law and [the] determin[ation] of its existence
depend [s]exclusively on facts of human behavior capable of being described in valueneutral terms and applied without resort to moral argument." JOSEPH RAZ, THE AuTHORITY OF LAw 39-40, 47 (1975). Raz's argument depends in part on ordinary linguistic usage, but another part invokes "the basic underlying function of law: to
provide publicly ascertainable standards by which members of the society are held to
be bound so that they cannot excuse non-conformity by challenging the justification
of the standard... [t]hough ... they are free to act to change it." Id. at 52. Raz's
appeal to the point of having an authority could provide an alternative backing for
legal neutrality, see Stephen Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62
S. CAL.L. REV. 913, 947-53 (1989), but, on examination, appears to become ensnared
in difficulties of its own, see William Edmundson, Rethinking Exclusionary Reasons: A
Second Edition ofJoseph Raz's PracticalReason and Norms, 12 LAw & PHIL. 329 (1993).
43 Legal neutrality is presumably meant to apply to constitutional provisions and
entrenched common law doctrine as well as to statutory enactments.
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state is legitimated only by its alleged (legal) neutrality, then it is
illegitimate. Altman's general answer to Unger and CLS draws on
Hart's primary/secondary rules distinction. The main idea is that
law contains "secondary rules of meaning" that pin down which of
the several possible, alternative, normatively-charged readings of a
primary rule is correct. Thus, wide value-dissensus does not entail
dissensus as to the meaning of a primary rule if secondary rules of
meaning exist to pin it down, and legal neutrality is thus possible.
CLS's response to Altman's proposal would be that social dissensus about the right and the good is so great that its "semantic
reverberations" swamp the secondary rules of meaning." But, Altman answers, CLS has not shown that dissensus is so widespread
that secondary rules of meaning are impossible. For example, after
Roe v. Wade,45 "person" under the 14th Amendment does not mean
fetal life, notwithstanding the deep disagreements in society about
what it ought to mean. Similarly, after Boys Markets,46 a "forbidden
labor injunction" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply
to an injunction of a strike in breach of a "no-strike" clause, called
to protest an arbitrable grievance-notwithstanding the minority
position (and the Court's own precedent in SinclairRefining Co. v.
Atkinson4 7 ) to the contrary. CLS admits it knows the rule of these
cases even as it criticizes them. Therefore, Altman concludes, CLS
confesses that the needed secondary rules of meaning exist despite
a background of intense controversy as to what the appropriate primary rule of conduct is.
Altman instances Owen Fiss's "disciplining rules" as examples
of what he means by secondary rules of meaning.4 8 Fiss invokes
disciplining rules as a sufficient constraint upon judicial interpretation to reconcile indeterminacy with the requirements of political
legitimacy, just as Altman does. Fiss's examples of disciplining
rules consist of nostrums like: "look to history," "use the appropriate level of generality," "take account of intention," and "do not be
influenced by personal animosity or bias."4 9
What is missing, however, is an indication of how such seconsupra note 3, at 83-84.
45 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), overrulingSinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). See also ALTMAN, supra
44 ALTMAN,

note 3, at 84-85; Karl Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITCS OF

LAw 67-82 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
47 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
48 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 81 n.32.
49 See Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 747-50 (1982). I
have taken the liberty of fleshing out the wording of these examples.
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dary rules are to be applied. They seem to be just as "normatively
charged" as primary rules of conduct, and also capable of differing
applications as well as conflicts with one another. We cannot be
referred to further, "tertiary"5" rules of meaning to settle controversy about how to apply them, for that would begin a vicious regress, as Stanley Fish has argued against Fiss.51 Following a
secondary rule-like following any rule-necessarily involves the
idea of "going on the same way," and the "way" intended is ulti53
mately inexplicable by reference to rules.5 2 For example, we read
this arrow: "-" to mean "go right" even though reading it to mean
"go left" would be a possible way of "following" the arrow. What
settles the meaning of the arrow? It is not much help to be told,
for example, to "Read signs the way others do" unless there is, in
fact, such a way. What the Legal Realists and, lately, CLS have been
reiterating is that there is not a way to read a precedent, and that
what such things as Fiss's disciplining rules reflect is the variety of
ways in which precedents are in fact read. This is not to deny that
our conventional understanding of how to read precedents could
be as uniform as our understanding of arrows; it is simply to point
out that it is not and-in conditions of pluralism-cannot be.
Altman would argue that conventions regarding precedent
could be uniform even in conditions of pluralism, and that this possibility refutes the CLS conceptual point:
Why would it be impossible for there to be a pluralist society in
which, for example, the reigning convention was to read precedents narrowly? Such a convention would be a kind of secondary rule and would . . .settle any serious problem with the
indeterminacy of precedents.5 4
The CLS answer to Altman would be this: a secondary rule enjoining judges to "read precedents narrowly" would be ambiguous between at least the two following interpretations: "read precedents
narrowly, but not too narrowly," and, alternatively, "read precedents as
narrowly as possible." The first interpretation would depict a pluralist
world in which the normatively charged phrase "narrow, but not too
50 1 owe this term to Paul Milich.
51 See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984).
52 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

1 198 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).
53 Assuming that we are looking at the arrow in normal conditions, e.g., face on
and not in a mirror, not through the reverse side of the page on which it is printed,
not with the page upside down, etc. Spelling out "normal conditions" is itself an
uncompletable task. Cf Richard Warner, Three Theories of Legal Reasoning, 62 S.CAL.

L. REv. 1523 (1985).
54

Letter from Andrew Altman to William Edmundson (Apr. 19, 1991).
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narrow" just works out to have the same meaning for everybody-but
this picture simply fails to take pluralism seriously. The second interpretation avoids indeterminacy, but only by limiting every case to its
precise facts; by, in other words, destroyingthe doctrine of precedent.5 5
Altman's examples of secondary rules of meaning appear, in any
case, to be dramatically more concrete than Fiss's examples of disciplining rules.5 6 But their very concreteness undercuts their prior
availability and their generality. For example, if Boys Markets tells us
that a court may enjoin a strike in breach of a no-strike clause, where
the strike concerns an arbitrable grievance, it did not pin down the
meaning of "forbidden labor injunction" sufficiently to determine
whether a no-strike clause permits the enjoining of a sympathy strike
which, although itself arbitrable, does not concern any other arbitrable grievance. Only by freshly assessing the moral merits of the competing values-labor "peace" versus labor solidarity-can such an
issue be decided, as the Court in fact did in the subsequent case of
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers." Just as the Legal Realists insisted, whether the secondary rule of meaning laid down in Boys Markets is narrowly drawn, and in a way thus not reaching the new case, or
broadly drawn, and thus as reaching it, is never finally determined by
anything other than a fresh assessment of the merits.
True, the accretion of gap-filling decisions like Buffalo Forge over
time may appear to represent an asymptotic approach to an at least
local determinacy of doctrine.5 8 But this is an illusion, for three
reasons.
First, this "accretionist" view represents the accumulation of decisional points as determining the further development of the field.
But on the perfectly eligible, narrow, view of the precedential value of
these decisions, further development is pretty much wide open. The
narrow view of precedent would rather strictly (but not too strictly)
limit the precedential significance of a decision and, concomitantly,
regard as dictum any language in an opinion that purports to announce a rule for future cases other than those presenting the same
"relevant" facts. The narrow view is widely though not universally held
As in the case of Karl Llewllyn's rule for "redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 72 (1965).
56 See Fiss, supra note 49.
57 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (distinguishing Boys Markets and holding such an injunction
to be forbidden under the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
58 For a rendering of indeterminacy as an "episodic phenomenon ...rather than
a chronic and defining characteristic of law," see Frederic Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in
the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism'sResponse to Critical Legal Studies, 65 TUL. L. REv. 15, 28
(1990).
55
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by judges,59 and no argument has (or perhaps ought to be) advanced
to discredit it entirely.
Second, the accretionist view rests on the assumption that each
additional decision reduces the extent of the interstitial gaps that will
remain within any field of doctrine, much in the way that the accumulation of bugs on an automobile windshield tends to cover the windshield. The windshield analogy represents the field in which law
operates as of constant size, but an alternative analogy is also available.
The "path of the law" can just as readily be likened to the accumulation of dots on the surface of an inflating balloon; over time, the evergrowing number of dots covers ever less of the expanding surface.
The balloon analogy, in fact, seems an apter representation of the SinclairRefining, Boys Markets, Buffalo Forge line of cases, in which the precedential scope of earlier cases is curtailed by each later one and, thus,
each raises more questions than it settles.
Thirdly, the accretionist view represents Buffalo Forge-type authorities as somehow protected from gradual marginalization as subsequent courts freshly assess the merits within the field and thereby
reorganize it, as in MacPherson v. Buick Motor, and from overthrow,
such as befell SinclairRefining in Boys Markets. But they are not. Any
subsequent gap-filling decision is capable of unsettling a balance of
competing forces that may have seemed to hold the field in equipoise.
Despite the best efforts of a generation of liberal theorists, these
points have yet to be answered.
Suppose, though, that secondary rules of meaning do exist. CLS
will argue that bracketing moral controversy by using secondary rules
of meaning would create so much indeterminacy as to violate the rule
of law; for, without some "guiding vision" of the proper forms of
human association, legal reasoning would be "a game of easy analogies"-in Unger's phrase-in which anything can be gotten to go.60
Altman argues that the Ungerian critique of bracketing assumes
that legal neutrality entails that secondary rules of meaning may not
embody a normative view. This is a fatal mistake, Altman says; legal
neutrality means only that judges not reassess the rules' normative
soundness in applying them. But Altman does not explain how a sec59 For a defense of the view that the judge's duty is to fashion rules, see Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
60 Unger and Dworkin seem to be standing on common ground on the issue of
whether a decisionmaker can bracket normative controversy in rendering a legal

judgment, at least in "hard" cases. Both would answer, No. For Dworkin, the judicial

duty is to decide in accordance with the best constructive interpretation of the law.
For Unger, a judicial decision implies a ranking of analogical possibilities, and this
ranking necessarily reflects a normative assessment.
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ondary rule of meaning can so "embody" a normative position as to
both cure indeterminacy and preempt (re)examination of that normative position vis d vis its competitors. The contours of the normative position so embodied also demand interpretation, which can
proceed only by way of gauging the adequacy of alternative, candidate
interpretations both generally and in the case at hand. 61
The interpretation of such contours would be simplified if there
were some way to translate sets of legal rules that are the product of
the clash of conflicting aims into a set of usefully determinate rules
that embody a common aim. Where parties have congruent, if individual, interests in coordinating their behavior, as in the law
merchant, or as in chess, a common purpose can inform the interpretation of rules in a relatively straightforward way. We do not typically
view, say, the rules of chess from the "bad man's perspective" to satisfy
ourselves about their meaning. The bad man and others play chess
for approximately the same reasons, and since the rules "cut both
ways" (and detecting violations is easy) no player can hope to gain a
durable advantage by pursuing a controversial interpretation. Law is
like this, in some ways, but in many ways it is not.6 2
Legal rules invite controversial interpretation;6" detection of
those who give rules their preferred "spin" is not often easy; and actors in the adjudicative process have no dependable reason to worry
about their preferred, or "bad man" interpretations coming back to
haunt them. For example, large enterprises have little incentive to
worry that a crabbed reading of workplace safety or environmental
regulations will harm them; criminal defendants rarely weigh up the
costs of expansive interpretations of the exclusionary rule; and lawyers
are acculturated to be ready to urge either side of any legal issue, depending upon where the interest of the instant client lies.
It is a question of the generality at which aims are conceived.6 4 At
a very abstract level, everyone stands to gain by the existence of a legislative process (except those exceptional few who could do better in a
state of nature). At a more particular level, some win and some lose in
each particular running of that process. Statutes (and private bar61

Stanley Fish has made a similar point against Fiss's account. See Fish, supra note

51.

62 See LON FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 17-19 (temporary ed. 1949).
Raz contends that "[i ] t is only in exceptional circumstances that I must know the rea-

sons for the rule in order to know what to do."

JOSEPH

NORMS, 79-80 (2d ed. 1990).
63 Cf W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56

RAz,

PRAciCAL REASON AN

PROC. ARmSOTLLAN

(1955).
64 See Kress, supra note 8, at 299 n.57 (citing discussions).
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gains) are not uncommonly drafted to contain "creative tension" or
sweeping vagueness, in furtherance of no common aim other than of
mustering an adequate number of votes (or of getting the deal done).
Rules cannot be much more determinate than the purposes that animate them and the practices that embody them. One need not be a
rule-skeptic to doubt that those purposes and practices are as sharply
edged as the liberal theory of adjudicative legitimacy would have them
be.
Altman concedes that judges violate legal neutrality when, as in
Boys Markets, they fashion secondary rules by freshly assessing clashing
normative views. 65 But CLS needs, according to Altman, the additional premise that all cases are necessarily of this type or at least that
such cases are necessarily pervasive. Why must CLS show that cases
"requiring" fresh assessments are necessarily pervasive? Altman's answer is that if CLS wants to make a conceptual point-that the liberal
rule of law is "impossible"-then CLS has to rule out all possibilities
inconsistent with its claim.
This way of understanding the CLS critique accounts for the prevalence of the "argument from easy cases," which has been made by
Kress, Lawrence Solum, Frederick Schauer and Kent Greenawalt,
among others.6 6 But the "easy cases" argument misconstrues the spirit
in which much of the CLS critique is offered and is most charitably
taken. Suppose we grant Altman's point that there is no conceptual
necessity6 7 that liberal legal systems "contain" cases that "compel" a
fresh look at the moral merits-in other words, that law could be determinate. The question CLS wishes to press-and which is the more
supra note 3, at 88.
See Kress, supra note 8, at 296-97 & n.45 (citing others); Solum, supranote 13, at
471; Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1990). There
are, however, hardy souls prepared to deny that any case is easy. See, e.g., Anthony
D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction:Refuting Indeterminacy with One Bold Stroke, 85 Nw. U.
L. REv. 113 (1990).
67 The "fact of reasonable pluralism" that John Rawls has insisted on may not appear to be a "conceptual truth" in the sense that Altman intends. It just so happens,
as a matter of contingent, empirical fact, that modern democracies contain a plurality
of groups and individuals who reasonably disagree among themselves about what
makes life valuable. But Rawls has intimated that in any society "well-ordered" by his
principles of justice-as-fairness "a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable-and
what's more, reasonable-comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist if
such diversity does not already obtain." RAWLs, supra note 10, at 36 (emphasis added). As a "permanent feature of the public culture of democracy," id., then, such
diversity comes quite close to being conceptually tied to the liberal vision of justice.
To the extent that this is so, the CLS critique does impugn the conceptual coherence
of the liberal conception of the rule of law, for the CLS critique shows that the fact of
reasonable pluralism plus the interpretive nature of adjudication means that legal
rights and duties do not generally preexist the outcomes they are invoked to explain.
65 ALTMAN,
66
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pertinent-is not whether law can be determinate, but whether it can
be sufficiently determinate in conditions of pluralism to satisfy liberal
political morality's demand for legal neutrality. The CLS point is not
aridly conceptual but one about what is possible given the world as it
is.
V.

THE INCOHERENCE OF LEGAL DOCTRINE

The CLS first prong attack is intended to show that liberal
legal theory is trapped in a conceptual dilemma-liberal theory
must exclude normative judgment from adjudication to keep judging neutral, but it must admit normative judgment into adjudication to make it determinate. Liberalism, for CLS, demands both
neutrality and determinacy, but it cannot have both. The second
prong of attack seeks to establish that Anglo-American legal doctrine-not as a conceptual matter, but as it actually exists-is incoherent. If the second prong succeeds, the liberal conception of
the rule of law may be seriously damaged even if the first CLS
prong of attack fails.
The CLS charge of doctrinal incoherence comprises three distinct theses. The first of the three CLS "doctrinal incoherence"
theses is the "patchwork" thesis. It holds that legal doctrine is an
unprincipled landscape (or "patchwork") of norms drawn from incompatible ethical viewpoints. The second thesis, the "duck/rabbit"
thesis, holds that the "structure" of legal doctrine differs, depending on the ethical viewpoint it is seen from, in much the same way
that a figure/ground illusion will be seen to represent one or another object, depending upon which visual cues the eye takes as
significant and which as secondary. The third thesis, the "truncation" thesis, states that the normative principles that underlie legal
rules are not consistently applied over the ranges they logically
command.
The CLS "doctrinal incoherence" prong of attack assumes that
the liberal conception of the rule of law requires that doctrine
form a coherent body, and that liberalism counts Anglo-American
legal doctrine as exemplifying the liberal rule of law. These assumptions seem reasonable and are widely made. If CLS can show
that contemporary Anglo-American legal doctrine fails to exhibit
the degree of coherence that liberal legal theory requires, then to
that extent liberal legal theory will have been discredited as a constructive account of the legal practices it most recommends.
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The Patchwork Thesis

The patchwork thesis holds that it is impossible to reconstruct
legal doctrine upon a consistent set of principles because there are
substantial portions of legal doctrine that can be reconstructed
only on principles that are inconsistent with other principles upon
which other portions of legal doctrine must be reconstructed. 68
Most CLSers look to Duncan Kennedy's individualism/altruism dichotomy as the source of these inconsistent principles. 69 CLS
thinks that the patchwork thesis shows that intra-doctrinal conflicts
cannot be solved at the level of principle, for at that level the conflicts are merely "replicated in a more abstract form."7" Thus, efforts like Dworkin's to cure legal indeterminacy by having judges
consult "the soundest theory of settled law" are doomed,7 1 and,
moreover, liberalism generally cannot avoid the dilemma of having
either to abandon its conception of the rule of law or to condemn
Anglo-American systems of law as incompatible with that
conception.
One line of CLS argument for the patchwork thesis is genetic;
in a liberal state the law is the product of the clash of diverse interests and viewpoints, and therefore "it would be strange" if the resulting doctrine were to reflect any "immanent moral rationality
whose message could be articulated by a single cohesive theory. "72
Altman rejects the genetic argument on the ground that it "conflates" patchwork with an essentially empirical claim that legal doctrine is the product of the sociocultural clash of conflicting
interests and viewpoints. 73 But Altman's "conflation" dismissal
seems too quick. Although patchwork is an assertion about the logical character of doctrine, it simply is not true that it cannot be
supported by empirical or genetic premises. Suppose, for example, that I have written ten randomly selected sentences each on a
separate slip of paper, and for each sentence I have written its denial on a separate slip of paper. I put the twenty slips of paper into
a hat and have a chimpanzee draw out ten slips. It would indeed
68 Altman had in earlier work described patchwork as presenting "unmet and seri-

ous challenges to the viability of the Dworkinian jurisprudential project, as well as to
other conventional legal philosophies." Altman, supra note 5, at 227.
69 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication,89 HARv. L.
REV. 1685 (1976); see also Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of

Intepretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983).
70 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 118.

71 See Altman, supra note 5, at 222-23.
72 UNGER, supra note 40, at 9.
73 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 121-22.
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"be strange" if the set of sentences drawn from the hat form a consistent set-but what makes that claim plausible is what I have said
about how the set was generated.
1. A Coherentist Answer to "Patchwork"?
Ken Kress approaches the genetic argument for patchwork differently. He finds its weakness to lie in its implicit assumption that
jurisgenetic forces-such as political motives-are themselves
law.7 4 This assumption, Kress suggests, should simply be rejected.
But what of political motives that have found expression in justifications set out in judicial opinions? Kress argues that even such
officially articulated motives may properly be discounted in an adequate reconstruction of doctrine, for a coherentist legal theory has
two further tools at its disposal: (1) rogue statements of doctrinal
principle can be relegated to the category of dictum, d la the "narrow" view of precedent identified by the Legal Realists, and (2)
better entrenched but still troublesome doctrinal principles can be
75
rejected as "institutional mistakes."
Kress argues that there are both positivist (Sartorian) and natural law (Dworkinite) theories that make use of these tools, and
that can thus "resist the force of the patchwork quilt argument for
indeterminacy by driving a wedge between judicial justifications
and legal principles." 76 A quick look at each of the candidate theories raises doubts, however.
Sartorius renders law as consisting of two types of materials.
The first type includes constitutional and legislative enactments
plus judicial precedents construed in the narrow sense, that is, as
judgment and facts shorn of the ratio decidendi and dictum. The
second type of material includes those "principles and policies that
imply the [type one] authoritative sources." 77 This account allows
legal theory to discard rogue statements of principle in judicial
opinions not only where they fail to explain the outcome of the
case in which they occur, but also where a "holistic account of all
judicial decisions may find alternative policies and principles preferable, ' 78 as, for example, in Brandeis and Warren's celebrated
synthesis of scattered common law decisions under the novel theosupra note 8, at 303.
75 See id. at 304 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrs SERIOUSLY 118-23
74 Kress,

(1978)).
76 See id. at 305.
77

Id. at 304-05.

78 Id. at 305.
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retical rubric of a "right to privacy." 79 This claim is of a piece with
Kress's general criticism that CLS narrowly targets deductive models of legal reasoning, while ignoring "less stingy inferential techniques such as argument by analogy and those employed in
coherence ["holistic?"] theories."8 0
The weakness of Kress's Sartorian counterattack is that the
coherentist or holistic approach to legal truth is, like any other
coherentist truth theory, unable to respond to the charge that it
"relativizes" truth, viz., that it makes truth determinate only relative
to some further criterion of systemic desirability.8 1 The problem
can be simply stated: for any inconsistent set of propositions S
there are at least two self-consistent (i.e., coherent) but mutually
inconsistent subsets T and T' What is there to choose between T
and T?8 2 The coherentist method Kress describes enables us to
choose between Tand T'by referring us to such things as "theoretical simplicity"" or "institutional role, legal conventions, conventional morality, critical morality, and political theory [which] enrich
84
legal reasoning and reduce indeterminacy.
Kress is correct that these "enrichments" are indispensable;
unfortunately they cannot be relied upon to reduce indeterminacy,
and in fact they often aggravate it. Even the seemingly innocuous
standard of "theoretical simplicity" can be employed only after one
has made a judgment that simplicity and its cognate virtues-e.g.,
predictive richness, comprehensibility-are weightier than competing virtues, such as fact-sensitivity, flexibility, and equity. But, as
Duncan Kennedy's discussion of rules and standards illustrates, the
choice between these values is arbitrary unless grounded in some
further, more comprehensive, and surely-to-be-controversial political theoretic stance, which when fully elaborated will have to assign weights to the various systemic values and articulate principles
bringing those weights into proper balance. An appreciation of
this point undermines the supposed contrast between Dworkinite
79 See id. at 304; Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193, 193-97 (1890).
80 ALTMAN, supranote 3, at 329. For criticism of the idea that analogical reasoning

can render legal reasoning determinate, see Warner, supranote 53, at 1552-55; see also
BURTON, supra note 14, at 39-40.
81 For a thoroughgoing critique of the vogue of coherence theories, see Joseph
Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REv. 273 (1992).
82 For a similar point against Dworkin, see Neil MacCormick, Dworkin as PeBenthamite, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE 184-85, 192 (Cohen ed., 1983).
83 Kress, supra note 8, at 305.
84 Id. at 328.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:557

and Sartorian reasoning; for if Sartorian reasoning is stabilized
only by Kress-style enrichments, Sartorian theory will require as
much working-out as any full-blown Dworkinite "constructive interpretation." To the extent that Altman's "best fit" convention is intended to represent a conventionally employed coherence theory
6
of legal truth, 5 it is liable to the same criticisms.8

Sartorian coherentism is not, as both Kress and Altman seem
to think, a genuine alternative to Dworkinite reconstruction. Ironically, Altman himself has elsewhere shown the implausibility of a
Dworkinite answer to CLS. 7 Altman has argued, inter alia, that
Dworkin's "soundest theory of settled law" must contain "metalevel
principle [s] for determining the appropriate weights to be assigned
to the different principles which may be applicable in any given
case.""8 Otherwise, when conflicting principles apply in an unsettled case, there is nothing for the judge to discern, nothing upon
which to hang the preexisting legal rights and duties that are the
only legitimate basis for decision. But CLS can simply point out
that "no one has come up with such metaprinciples, and it is implausible to think that it can be done" until Dworkinites exhibit
something like a soundest theory of at least some limited, non-gerrymandered area of doctrine. 9 Nothing in Altman's later writing
suggests that conventional legal theory has met this challenge.
Kress scoffs at Altman's critique of Dworkin because it-along
with CLS-assumes that Dworkin must produce "explicit
metaprinciples to resolve conflicts between rules, principles and
85 In earlier work, Altman has disparaged "the idea that legal form, particularly the
fit requirement, ... screen[s] out a significant range of political controversy" from
doctrine. See Altman, supra note 5, at 232.
86 Altman is not particularly forthcoming about his understanding of what "fit"
means. His usage suggests that he means it as a measure of logical coherence: x "fits" z
better than y fits zjust in case x has a greater degree of logical coherence with z than y
has-but logical coherence does not come in degrees. "Fit" thus has to mean something more than mere logical coherence or internal consistency, and thus presumably
means pretty much the same as Sartorian coherentism and Kress's holism.
In saying that coherence does not come in degrees I am assuming that Altman
has no interest in such degrees as they might be defined in certain nonstandard (i.e.,
n-valued, n>2) systems of formal logic. Dworkin has acknowledged that gauging degrees of fit has to involve more than mere bean-counting, and is in fact "in the last
analysis... responsive to [the judge's] politicaljudgment." DWORK1N, supranote 2, at
65-68, 254-58. Even if some comparative relation were proposed, the problem then
becomes, as Joseph Raz has pointed out, that "the relation 'a more coherent theory
than' is not connected, that is, various theories are neither more nor less coherent
than each other." Raz, supra note 81, at 298.
87 See Altman, supra note 5, at 227-35.
88 Id. at 217-18.
89 Id.at 219.
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other authoritative materials."9 0 Similarly, Burton has suggested
that any demand for a "further ground... leads to a regress, so the
request should be declined when it first appears."91 Kress suggests
that we abandon the impossible demand for metaprinciples and
content ourselves instead with Kantian mutterwitz while we "construct deeper and more fundamental justificatory schemes" using
weighted principles and "the subtlest, most fine-grained measure
of weight possible."9 2
Burton's point is of no significance unless he means that answering the demand for a principled basis for ranking one authority over another would begin a "vicious" or "infinite" regress. But if
this is what he means then what he says is simply not true. Courts,
in fact, make such declarations almost as a matter of routine, as, for
example, in MacPherson,where the court took pains to give reasons
for subordinating the privity principle to a principle of compensation in the context of modem manufacture and distribution. Demanding a reason to follow one principle rather than another does
not begin a vicious regress in the way that invoking a further rule
to explain how each rule is to be applied would.
Kress's remarks suggest that he is not really able to decide
whether to retreat to an intuitionist stance or to press on altior et
fortior with the impossible task of explicating the (un)necessary
weighting metaprinciples. An intuitionist response would be to
rank authorities without giving any reason other than the apt seeming of that ranking. For reasons that I will not belabor, intuition90 Kress, supra note 8, at 331.

91 Letter from Steven Burton to William Edmundson (Apr. 15, 1991).
92 Kress, supra note 8, at 334-35. "Mutterwitz" is German for "mother wit." As Kant
explains:
If understanding ... is ... the faculty of rules, judgment will be the
faculty of subsuming under rules ....
[S] ince general logic abstracts
from all content of knowledge, [its] sole task... is... to obtain formal
rules for all employment of understanding. If it is sought to give general instruction how we are to subsume under these rules... that could
only be by means of another rule. This in turn, for the very reason that
it is a rule, again demands guidance from judgment. And thus it appears that, though understanding is capable of being instructed, and of
being equipped with rules, judgment is a peculiar talent which can be
practiced only, and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of socalled mother-wit; and its lack no school can make good.
IMMANUEL KANT, CRTQUE OF PURE REASON 177 (Norman K. Smith trans., 1929) (emphasis added). To foreclose any possibility of misunderstanding, Kant adds, in a footnote, that "[d]eficiency in judgment is just what is ordinarily called stupidity
["Dummheit"], and for such a failing there is no remedy." Id. at 178 n.a. It should be
remembered that in 1781, when Kant wrote, ordinances excluding vehicles from
parks were a rarity.
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ism is not an attractive option.95
There is irony in Dworkin's reliance on what Kress calls a
"dense and discriminating moral metric" to support the choice between sets T and T'" 4 There is irony, too, in Altman's and Kress's
inability to make out an alternative to Dworkin's approach. Dworkin commits himself to a Herculean determinacy in ethics while
the predominant, Rawlsian strain of liberal thinking despairs of
such a commitment. Dworkin, as legal theorist, seems to lack a
sense of priority, for in straining to prop up an account of the rule
of law, he threatens to topple what seem to be more profound liberal doctrines: namely, the link between legitimacy and (mortal)
understandability, and the fact of reasonable pluralism.9 5 It may
be, as Hart suggested, that the rule of law has to be understood as a
subordinate value in a fully worked-out liberal position.9 6
2.

The "Standard" Argument for Patchwork

CLS offers other arguments for "patchwork," but in these Alt93

Altman has noted the defects of intuitionism. See Altman, supra note 5, at 218.

This is not to say that intuitionism is friendless. See, e.g., Sm PATRIcK DEVLUN, Ti
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS viii-ix, 15 (1965) ("indignation and disgust" that is nonethe-

less "calm and dispassionate" may legitimately be invested with the force of law);
Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1136 (subject to incompletely
specified coherentist constrains, "[o]ne may form an intuition that some action is
wrong by the inference one draws from one's emotions of revulsion .... .").
94 Kress, supra note 8, at 301. See Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 31-32 (1978).
95 The crucial point here is that Dworkin will allow judges to invoke controversial
moral views to decide "hard" cases, while Rawls and other liberals will not. See, for
instance, Rawls's rather tentative endorsement of Dworkin's account of constitutional
adjudication, in RAWLS, supra note 10, at 236-37 & n.23. Rawls thinks that any theory
of constitutional adjudication that allows judges to invoke "a conception of morality
as such, [or] even of political morality" is "too broad." Id. For example, Rawls would
not allow ajudge to appeal even to a correct principle of distributive justice "unless it
appears as a guideline in a statute." Id. Rawls believes that Dworkin "thinks that his
[i.e., Dworkin's] requirement of fit alone leads to roughly the same conclusion," but
Rawls is unsure. Id. Rawls wants, in addition to "fit," to require that any judicial interpretation "fall within the public political conception ofjustice or a recognizable variant thereof." Id. A "public political conception ofjustice" is in Rawls's theory one that
is grounded in ideas "implicit in the public culture of a democratic society" and not in
any controversial "comprehensive" conception of social justice. Id. at 15-16. Rawls
must mean to be saying, with perhaps undue delicacy, that Dworkin's theory allows
judges too much leeway to engage in moral theorizing on the bench.
96 See HART, supra note 27, at 121-32. Although Rawls includes "the rights and
liberties covered by the rule of law" as an element of the "fully adequate scheme [of]
...equal basic liberties" demanded by his first principle of justice, see Rawls, supra
note 18, at 5, he appears to be willing to tolerate rather substantial deviations in the
name of furthering the overall provision of equal liberty. See RAwLS, supra note 16, at
235-43.
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man discerns a standard pattern: (1) specify a doctrinal principle
and a counterprinciple (e.g., "as between two innocent parties, the
one causing the loss shall bear it" and "no liability without fault");
(2) formulate presumably incompatible ethical norms (e.g., Kennedy's individualism and altruism); (3) claim that there is a link
between the respective principles and norms; (4) conclude that the
doctrinal principles must be incompatible and that doctrine is not
rationally reconstructible.
Altman argues that the flaw in this pattern is the step from
number three to number four. This step is fallacious because, in
fact, both principle and counterprinciple can be tied to either
norm. For example, the fraud and unconscionability doctrines in
the theory of contract formation can be derived both from altruist
norms and individualist ones, as Kennedy himself concedes. But,
Altman says, Kennedy's point destroys the CLS patchwork thesis.
Incompatible ethical views do influence doctrine in a pluralist society, and "logical links" between doctrine and such ethical views do
exist, but patchwork does not follow.9 7 CLS needs "strong" logical
links between ethical norms and their counterpart legal principles
for the patchwork thesis to work, but these links do not exist, as
shown by Kennedy's own admission.9 8
Altman's logical point-that the incoherence of doctrine cannot be inferred simply from the antagonism of eligible, unqualified, reconstructing principles-is surely correct. But, as I discuss
more fully at the end of this section, this does nothing to block the
earlier, Legal Realist critique, which did not depend upon the
existence of logically inconsistent principles. Furthermore, the
logical point Altman makes against this "standard" CLS argument
for patchwork commits him to a view of the plasticity of ethical
viewpoints that is ultimately an embarrassment for the position he
wants to defend, as I will also argue.
B.

The Duck-Rabbit Thesis

The duck-rabbit thesis-which is present in Unger and Kennedy-holds that the individualism/altruism dichotomy shows itself in the structure, not the content, of doctrine.9 9 For CLS,
individualism is the dominant perspective on private law doctrine;
97 ALTMAN, supra
98 Id. at 129.

note 3, at 128.

99 The importance of the emphasis upon structure, as opposed (presumably) to
content, is elusive. After all, no points are scored against liberalism unless the alleged "structural" indeterminacy cashes out somehow in terms of an insidious ambiguity of doctrinal content. See discussion infra at notes 121-29.

582

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:557

but for Unger this dominance could be reversed without dramatically changing doctrine. Unger identifies principles and counterprinciples of contract law and describes two views of the relation
between them. The principles serve to facilitate transactions by
curtailing the role of courts as monitors of the substantive fairness
of bargains. Counterprinciples, such as the unconscionability doctrine, relax the principles' assumption of arms-length bargaining
between parties of equal power, and thereby open factual and legal
issues that principles would close.
The dominant view of the relation between principles and
counterprinciples is that the counterprinciples are anomalous and
marginal, and should remain so. Unger's own "deviationist"l0 0
view is that counterprinciples can gradually reverse position with
principles-and should do so. The "dominant" view thus ratifies
the principles' sharp division of the sphere of family and friends
from the economic sphere. Deviationism repudiates this division
and urges instead that courts move legal duty along a natural continuum in direction of moral duty.101
Altman underscores three points by Unger that liberals cannot
and need not refute: (1) that the proper relation between individualist principle and altruist counterprinciple is a function of the
political duty to share; (2) that legal reasoning is flexible enough
to allow correction of the present relation between principle and
counterprinciple; and (3) such a correction could reverse the present positions of principle and counterprinciple. Altman finds that
Unger's points are unanswerable but are wholly consistent with liberal legal philosophy. Liberalism requires that doctrine be objective-i.e., that there be some "objective and determinate
relationship between principles and counter-principles"-but not
that that relationship remain what it is now. 10 2 In Altman's view,
the "significant . . . indeterminacy" that he has conceded to be
present in the law allows Unger's deviationism to triumph "over
time. "103
It is hard to envisage how the "deviationist turn" that Altman
believes consistent with legal neutrality could occur without "fresh
assessments" of the moral merits of the counterpoised principles
100 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 132 (citing
IES MOVEMENT 58-90 (1986)).

ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRmCAL LEGAL STUD-

101 I omit discussion of a more radical interpretation of the "duck/rabbit" thesis.
Cf id. at 138-39.
102 Id. at 137.
103 Id. at 137-38.
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and counterprinciples that shape legal doctrine.104 Calling this a
reversal of structure rather than content will not do. No matter
how structure and content are to be contrasted, it is impossible to
picture principle and counterprinciple reversing positionswhether "over time" or overnight-without some significant doctrinal adjustments. To suppose that, for example, the principle of
freedom of contract might reverse positions with the counterprinciple that bargains in derogation of the family are not to be
enforced (Altman's example) is to imagine complimentary adjustments in wide areas of legal doctrine-or, if you like, "sub-doctrine." Freedom of contract and protection of the family cannot be
said to have reversed positions unless something gives elsewhere in
the doctrinal realm. Cases which hold that the unwisdom of a contract is no defense to its enforcement, even where the unwisdom is
evident to the obligor and bears upon the obligee's ability to perform familial duties, will have to be overruled-or something like
this must occur if the imagined reversal is to be anything real.
The deviationist shift is incompatible with legal neutrality unless indeterminacy is rife, for where doctrine is determinate the
deviationist turn cannot proceed without a "fresh assessment" of
the relative moral merits of principle and counterprinciple. Therefore, it is difficult to conceive how the deviationist turn can be reconciled with the "determinate relationship between principles and
counterprinciples" 10 5 that Altman requires as a condition of structural objectivity. The sympathy that Altman extends to deviationist
doctrine is not readily accommodated by his simultaneous defense
of legal neutrality. Even if Altman is correct (as I believe he is
not 10 6) that the deviationist turn to family values is reconcilable
104 In correspondence, Altman has indicated that he can accommodate the "deviationist turn" because "in my system... the best fit convention sometimes breaks down
under moral pressure. When this happens, there can indeed be a fresh assessment
and over time such moral pressure can effect a doctrinal shift of the sort deviationists
are hoping for." Letter from Andrew Altman to William Edmundson (Apr. 19, 1991).
The difficulty that Altman's suggestion raises is the uncertainty of the level of
"moral pressure" sufficient to justify revisiting the moral merits. Presumably, there is
no conventional answer, for if there were we would still be within the "best fit" convention. If there is no conventional answer, then what index are judges to use to
decide whether the moral heat is great enough to justify a revisiting of the moral
merits? Altman leaves no clue. Worse, any plausible index will be sensitive to the
particular moral differences whose composition is reflected in current law-so one
has to peek at the moral merits even to tell whether there is sufficient "moral pressure" to justify revisiting them.
105 Presumably the existence of such a "determinate relationship" cannot help but
entail something like the Dworkinite weighting principles that Altman has elsewhere
questioned. See Altman, supra note 5, at 217-20.
106 See my Stability and Neutrality in the Liberal State (forthcoming).
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with liberal political theory, he has not made out a convincing case
that it is reconcilable with liberal legal neutrality-for it either
must require widespread judicial reassessment of the moral merits
of a diverse and interconnected body of legal doctrine, or must go
together with a concession that in the relevant areas doctrine is
sufficiently indeterminate that such a reassessment cannot be said
to unsettle preexisting legal rights and duties.
C.

The Truncation Thesis

The truncation thesis states that the ethical norms underlying
legal principles are not carried through to their logical extreme.
Because no Hegelian synthesis of legal doctrine is likely, Altman
believes that Unger is correct that "many (though not necessarily
all) of the ethical principles that underlie doctrinal rules will have
their range of application truncated,"10 7 and Altman endorses Unger's claim that the equal protection doctrine and the "good Samaritan" doctrine in tort each truncate one of their animating
principles. But Unger is wrong to say that truncation is incompatible with liberalism-in fact, Altman argues, liberal theory leads us
to expect truncation. Even in a "pure politics of principle," liberal
political compromise yields truncation.
Altman recognizes that the truncation thesis denies the possibility of rational reconstruction of doctrine, although truncation's
way to this result does not involve-as the "standard" argument for
patchwork does-the claim that the impossibility derives from a
necessary inconsistency between explanatory ethical norms and
some part of doctrine. Oddly, he does not say why it is that, if
truncation is correct and inconsistent with the possibility of rational reconstruction of doctrine, this in itself is not fatal to the
liberal theory of law. He could of course deny that liberalism is
committed to the rational reconstructibility of doctrine, but this,
without more, would hardly do.
Altman is better understood to be prepared to argue that liberalism can and need only offer what amounts to a sort of meta107 ALmAN, supra note 3, at 142. On Ronald Dworkin's view to be a principle is to
be truncated:
We say that our law respects the principle that no man may profit from
his own wrong, but we do not mean that the law never permits a man to
profit from the wrongs he commits. In fact, people often profit, perfectly legally, from their legal wrongs.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIousLY 25 (1978). Altman interprets Dworkin as
rejecting "non-truncation" as a descriptive principle, but as mistakenly adopting nontruncation-or "integrity"-as a prescriptive ideal. See ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 146.
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reconstruction of doctrine, i.e., to show that legal doctrine can be
rationally reconstructed not from a single, comprehensive ethical
viewpoint, but from the less-than-comprehensive viewpoint of a
Rawlsian "political conception ofjustice." l a Doctrine itself has an
objective structure, which it owes to its having sufficient coherence
to support ajudicial convention that requires thatjudgment follow
the outcome having the best fit with the remainder of doctrine.
But doctrine nonetheless features "significant indeterminacy" and
"is filled with contradiction,"" ° so that reconstruction in terms of a
coherent, comprehensive ethical viewpoint is impossible.
D.

DoctrinalIncoherence and the "Cluster" Thesis

Is the overall position Altman takes for liberalism, in response
to the CLS attack on the coherence of legal doctrine, really tenable? This position involves, as he admits, significant concessions:
the truncation thesis and the duck/rabbit thesis are "convincing
and important."1 1 ° Doctrine-or at least its structure-is ambiguous enough to allow Unger's deviationism gradually to reverse the
positions of the currently dominant set of individualist principles
and the subordinate set of altruist counterprinciples; yet not so ambiguous as to invite a "fresh assessment" of the moral merits of such
principles, at least in the settled "core" of doctrine. As admirably
Solomonic as Altman's effort is, I do not think it can work.
The myopic focus on individualism and altruism disguises the
plurality of ethical and other viewpoints that inform the law, and
thus makes the duck/rabbit notion-that virtually all legal doctrine can be derived from "either" ethical viewpoint-seem more
plausible than it is. Adding but a single additional pair of counterpoised ethical viewpoints to the mix creates vastly more complexity.
For example, if we recognize efficiency and equity, as well as individualism and altruism, as influential normative principles, it becomes rather less plausible to extend Altman's position to say that
all doctrine is derivable from any one of these ethical viewpoints.
But unless doctrinal elements are "omniderivable," 111 that is, deriv108 The distinction between a "political conception of justice" and a "comprehensive moral view" is central to John Rawls's recent work. SeeJohn Rawls, The Domain of
the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 233 (1989), reprinted with modifications in RAwLs, supra note 10, at 131-172; cf Waldron, supranote 12, at 148 (discussing transparency and the "invisible hand").
109 ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 148.
110 Id.
111 Omniderivability is no more than superficially related to what has been called
the principle of coduction, which states that any proposition p can be derived from
indefinitely many distinct sets of premises, e.g., from {q, if q then p), {r, if r then p},
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able from or at least plausibly reconcilable with all such ethical
viewpoints, Altman's chief objection to the "standard" argument
for patchwork falters. For, unless they are omniderivable, doctrinal
elements begin to line up logically with particular ethical viewpoints. But to establish omniderivability, Altman would have to
further exaggerate the plasticity of ethical viewpoints, but it is not
easy to see how such an insistence on the plasticity of ethical views
would serve to demolish the CLS argument for the plasticity of
legal doctrine.
In fact, the omniderivability of doctrine undermines and does
not somehow secure liberal legal neutrality. If the essence of legal
neutrality is adjudication free of fresh assessment of the moral merits, then omniderivability undercuts legal neutrality for the reason
that it makes it impossible for a judge to tell which view of the merits
has prevailed in the legislative or common law arena. Any compromise could be seen equally well as a victory for any competing viewpoint. Thus, when the time comes to fill the gaps, judges are free
to view doctrine as a political authorization to decide according to
the moral merits. Judges need not even decide to make a fresh
assessment because omniderivability means that they may quite inethical
nocently reconstruct any authority as a mandate for any
11 2
congenial.
say,
to
is
which
plausible,
find
they
viewpoint
Altman denies that his refutation of the "standard" argument
for patchwork commits him to the admittedly implausible principle
that "any doctrinal element is consistent with any possible ethical
principle."1 1 Rather, he writes:
All I am committed to is the claim that there is some ethical
viewpoint with which all doctrinal norms are consistent. This is
because I am simply denying what the patchwork thesis asserts,
viz., that there is no such ethical viewpoint. The negation of this
claim is not that all ethical viewpoints are such, but rather that
there is at least one viewpoint that is such. And my claim, echoing Kennedy, is that individualism and altruism are two view{s, if s then p}, etc. The omniderivability that Altman claims holds that any doctrinal
element can be justified from any ethical viewpoint. Altman's attraction to the idea of
omniderivablity has affinities to Rawls's conception of an "overlapping consensus,"
which is Rawls's term for the bond that stabilizes a pluralistic society about a "political
conception ofjustice" which, ideally, would be derivable from any of the competing,
comprehensive moral conceptions represented in society. See Rawls, supra note 17, at
9.
112 This result ironically parallels an argument Altman earlier outlined, which CLS
could make against the ability of a Dworkinite soundest theory of settled law to serve
as a curb against judicial political predilection. See Altman, supra note 5, at 230-31.
113 Letter from Andrew Altman to William Edmundson (Apr. 19, 1991).
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points that are consistent with all doctrinal norms.1 1 4
Recall that the patchwork thesis consists of two claims: (1) a substantive claim and (2) a diagnostic claim. The substantive patchwork
claim is that "it is impossible to ...

rational[ly] reconstruct[ ] ...

the

body of legal doctrine by deriving its norms from a consistent set of
underlying principles.""' The diagnostic claim points to altruism and
individualism as incompatible ethical viewpoints whose conflict infects
doctrine and renders it incapable of rational reconstruction. Altman's point, in essence, is that Kennedy's admission with respect to
the diagnostic claim sinks the patchwork substantive claim. But this is
to ignore the point that there are-not one-but at least two, and
perhaps many more, incompatible, influential ethical viewpoints from
which legal doctrine can be rationally reconstructed. Altman fails to
see that this embarrassment of riches chokes off his defense of legal
neutrality even if it is an adequate refutation of the "standard" argument for patchwork.
Moreover, nothing in Altman's discussion even purports to answer the earlier, Legal Realist, arguments for indeterminacy, which
(unlike the "standard" argument for patchwork) did not try to tie the
multiple, eligible principles of decision to more comprehensive ethical norms.'
The Legal Realists argued, rather, that as to each genuinely novel fact situation there exist multiple doctrines-a "cluster"which, though not logically inconsistent, as major premises license
conflicting legal results. For example, 7 in the absence of a statutory
bar, a school board might condition a teacher's contract renewal
upon her signing a pledge not to join a union. If the major premise
the court consults holds that a party under no duty to do otherwise
may stipulate the terms of his bargain, then the "yellow dog" contract
stands. If, on the other hand, the court applies the principle that government entities must not condition terms of public employment so
as unreasonably to burden the associational freedoms of employees,
then the contract falls. 1 8 Notice that the alternative major premises
Id.
ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 117.
116 This is ironic, given that Altman has himself made this very charge against Hart.
See Altman, supra note 5, at 207.
117 The example is from HERMAN OUPHANr & ABRAM HEwrrIr, introduction to JAcQuEs RuEFF, FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INTRODUCTION TO A STUDY
114
115

OF ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL THEORY X-XXvi (Herman Green trans., 1929)
118 Further specifications are of course necessary to tighten up the respective legal
syllogisms. The court must, for example, find among its factual minor premises that
the school board is under no duty limiting its freedom to stipulate its terms. It is
doubtful whether legal reasoning ever attains logical soundness, i.e., takes the form of
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are not logically inconsistent; they conflict only in application and
even then only in certain factual settings.
A decision in a case like this requires that the judge give effect to
one of the two major premises rather than the other. The choice between conflicting major premises cannot be based upon induction or
analogy from past cases without begging the question as to the proper
result in a fresh case. Even if a past case contains language broad
enough to reach the novel case, common law doctrines leave room to
reject that language as mere dictum, and equally leave room to take
that language not as dictum but as the case's holding and thus as carrying full precedential weight.
This example illustrates what we might term-following Altman
himself-the "cluster thesis""' 9 and the Legal Realists' related attack
on the distinction between holding and dictum. Together, they call
into serious question the possibility of reconciling Anglo-American
legal practice with the Lockean stricture, which limits the legitimate
judicial function to the enforcement of preexisting legal rights and
duties. Rather than respond "non liquet" (i.e., the law is not clear)
when the law is not clear, Anglo-American courts discharge their traditional commission to fill gaps, plug holes, and balance values and infar as it will go," in Charles Fried's
terests 12°-to "stretch reason as
12 1
somewhat Panglossian phrase.
Altman is right that CLS has gone beyond the Legal Realists in
linking responses to the cluster problem to underlying ethical visions
(or two specific types of ethical vision). But nothing Altman says reconciles the Legal Realists' analysis with the liberal account of the rule
of law. More recently, Altman has suggested that
[t] he potential indeterminacy arising from the cluster problem is
substantially tamed by the fact that the law is a structured network in which not all norms belonging to the cluster are equally
pertinent ....This is why I place great emphasis on the importance of structure, as opposed to content. It's not that content is
unimportant; it is simply that if the law were just a formless collection of norms, a list of rules ...with no particular organiza-

tion to them, then the realist would be right: you could almost
always find one norm[ ] to support one decision and another to
deductively valid inferences from unexceptionably true premises. See Warner, supra
note 53, at 1542-48.
119 See Altman, supra note 5, at 208-12.
120 See RAz, supra note 62, at 139-40; M. REIsMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE
434-35 (1987).
121 See Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lauyers Know, 60 TEX.
L. REv. 35, 54-58 (1981).

1993]

TRANSPARENCY AND INDETERMINACY

589

support an opposing one. 12 2
The notion of "structure" invoked here is elusive unless it is imbued
with content; for unless there is a usable description of the structure,
the idea amounts to nothing more than hand-waving. What, one
wants to know, is there to structure other than the Dworkinian balancing principles that Altman has elsewhere despaired of locating? Or, if
this is simply an appeal to the fact that doctrinal boundaries are recognized and have some weight, as under Dworkin's principle of "local
priority,"1 25 it is to fail to recognize that these boundaries are highly
permeable and subject to constant pressure.1 24 Even for Dworkin, the
"initial classification" of a case to a doctrinal department is "[o] ften...
both controversial and crucial," 125 while the departments themselves
exist only by grace of "tradition... popular morality... [and] popular
opinion."126 A Dworkinite judge's attitude toward doctrinal boundaries is not one of absolute deference but of weighting and, ideally,
"local priority presents no impediment to a judge seeking a natural
flow of principle throughout the law." 127 Neither Altman nor Dworkin offer a word of argument to establish that doctrinal boundaries
partition the law without overlap, 128 and one has only to peruse any
129
pair of first-year casebooks to discover evidence to the contrary.
122 Letter from Andrew Altman to William Edmundson (Apr. 19, 1991). Altman
argues that Hart's and Benditt's criticisms of the Legal Realist's semantic theory "do
not touch the realist thesis that there is a pervasive indeterminacy in the legal system
owing to the existence of competing rules of law." Altman, supra note 5, at 212 (citing
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 39, 88; THEODORE BENDT, LAw As RuLE AND
PmNciPLE 46-50 (1978)).
123 See DwORKIN, supra note 2, at 250-54.
124 Compare Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129-38 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring)
(criticizing the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that consistency would require
that any provision so incorporated be applied identically in federal and state contexts,
thus either straitjacketing state experimentation or diluting curbs against federal
power) withJohnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366-80 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring
with the plurality) (rejecting the plurality's "premise" that an incorporated concept
applied to the states "must be identical in every detail to the concept required" at the
federal level).
125 DwORKIN, supra note 2, at 251.

126 Id. at 250-54.
127 Id. at 406.
128 Dworkin speaks of "concentric circles," id. at 250, as though each case nests

centrally in one department, rather than in multiple departments.
129 Is Rowland v. Christian, 433 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (holding that an occupier of
property has a duty to warn guests of a known hazard) a property case or a tort case?
Is an implied warranty a creature of tort or of contract? Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A with U.C.C. § 2-318. If fault is one thing in the law of torts and
another in the criminal law, is the same true of cause? Compare H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 325 (2d ed. 1985) ("the general course of decision in

the two spheres is strikingly similar") with Commonwealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310
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In sum, Altman has not turned aside the challenge posed by the
original, unextended Legal Realist insights, and has provided nothing
to show why those insights are not available to CLS. l ' ° He has at last
to come to terms with his admission that there is significant doctrinal
indeterminacy and that some cases are decided by "reliance on normative political judgments." Yet he stubbornly insists that "it would be
too quick" to conclude that the law/politics distinction fails in our
system, for two reasons: (1) "it may still be true" that in the "bulk of
cases" 13 ' legal reasoning can proceed without "fresh assessment" of
the moral merits; and (2) even where political judgments enter, they
132
may be constrained in ways that do not constrain legislators.
As to Altman's first point, the better CLS response is not merely
to argue (as Altman anticipates) that "fit" is empty, but also to point
out that the "best fit" convention is no more firmly entrenched than
the practice of repairing to Dworkinite reasoning. There is no consensus as to whether a judge ought to stop at fit. It is true enough, as
Altman has pointed out, that many judges insist that doing fit is all
that judicial duty will allow; but it is also true that many judges depart
from fit when they perceive sufficient moral pressure to do so; and still
others see themselves as Herculean interpreters in the Dworkinite
mold. "Best fit" is thus just as controversial as Dworkinite reasoning
(if, in fact, the two are fundamentally different) and-just as Altman
argues against Dworkin-there can be no convention in the face of
reasonable disagreement among qualified officials regarding the admissibility of factors that subordinate fit.
Any decision to stop at fit or to go on is underdetermined by
judicial convention, and any such decision is necessarily informed by a
conception of the normative merits of stopping or going on. Such
decisions are by Altman's own accounting political in that they involve
(1961) (holding that the broadened tort conception of cause is not applicable in
criminal cases).
130 Kress tackles the CLS/Legal Realist "cluster" analysis by limiting "reconstructive
technique" to "relevant or morally justifiable legal categories." Thus, reconstructive
techniques will lead to indeterminacy only where "there are contradictory legal standards that fit most precedents and tie as morally best." Kress, supra note 8, at 301. As
noted above, Kress thinks that a Dworkinite "dense and discriminating moral metric"
will be available to reduce such ties to an exotic few. But, as I urged above, there are
strong reasons to doubt that such a metric can be devised. Moreover, if there were
such a metric ready to hand, who would need liberalism? Indeed, who would need

law? See discussion supra notes 81-96.
131 ALTmAN, supra note 3, at 185. Here the appeal to the "bulk of cases" may mean
"somewhere between forty and sixty" of Tushnet's "determiniles." See Tushnet, supra
note 15, at 1538 (facetiously measuring degrees of determinacy in units called
"determiniles").
132

Id. at 185.
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a "fresh assessment" of the normative merits. To avoid fresh assessment where one is permissible (that is, not disallowed by the ruling
conventions) is to make a moral and political judgment, and it is this
judgment that CLS very persuasively insists that we recognize.
Altman's second point is that the law/politics distinction can be
usefully preserved so long as political judgments, even if they enter
adjudication, are constrained in some fashion in which they are not
constrained in the free-for-all of legislative deliberation. Altman contends that the fit convention provides this differential constraint, for
"unconstrained moral inquiry and political choice" have no fit requirement.1 33 I have already argued that coherentist "best fit" reasoning is
in the end drawn into the "moral metrics" of Dworkin,13 but CLS can
make two further replies to Altman's point. The first is to note that
Altman exaggerates the latitude both of legislative choice and of
moral argument. Moral argumentation is now widely understood to
be assessable only by reference to its coherence with the bulk of our
"reflective judgments" over the whole range of moral issues. Ironically, moral argument, far from being "unconstrained," is held to a
"best fit" standard longer if at all different in its Rawlsian/Quinian/
Neurathian philosophical pedigree than the "fit" tests of Altman,
Dworkin and Sartorius.

135

As to legislative choice, it must at the very least "fit" within the
boundaries of legislative competence, as that is conventionally understood. If Altman's point is that judicial reasoning is constrained by
the conventional understanding of judicial competence, while legislative reasoning is not, then he has simply begged the question as to the
existence of a distinctive and additional constraint upon judicial reasoning.1 36 The interesting issue cannot be whether there is a differ133 Id. at 192. Here, Altman echosJoseph Raz's claim that a regime that bids judges
to decide cases simply on the balance of all reasons "does not provide any guidance to
individuals on the behavior which would entitle them to a decision in their favour,
should a dispute arise." RAZ, supra note 62, at 138 (emphasis added). In answer to
Raz it may suffice to point out that if the tribunal is known to be guided by the balance of reasons then those reasons may well also guide the behavior those who may
come before it.
134 See discussion supra notes 75-96.
135 See WV. QUINE &J. ULLiAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970); RAWLS, supra note 16;
Otto Neurath, Protocol Sentences (George Schick, trans.) in LOGICAL POSITIVISM 199
(A.J. Ayer ed., 1959). I am assuming, as Paul Milich has pointed out to me, that CLS
can comfortably invoke this view of moral reasoning.
136 Even if Altman were granted the point that political judgments are subject to
special constraints in adjudication, CLS would be quick to add that these are rhetorica--not logical-constraints, that is, constraints upon how a decision is expressed
(and, often, defended), not upon how it is reached and justified. Many judges candidly admit that they make law and that the process of opinion-writing does not re-
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ence between legislating and adjudicating, it is rather whetherjudging
and lawmaking are sufficiently unlike to satisfy the Lockean, liberal the137
ory of judicial legitimacy.
One way to understand the CLS critique is as a mere hodgepodge, combining a rehash of Legal Realism as its negative component with an essentially unrelated (if not flatly inconsistent) positive
program of reform. But CLS can better be understood as a unary
attack upon the legitimacy of the liberal state on grounds of its unjustifiable restrictions upon politics and consequent tolerance of distributive inequalities, and its corrosive individualism at the expense of
community.13 Political judging would not raise an issue of legitimacy
for CLS were it not for the fact that the liberal theory of adjudicative
legitimacy has itself promised something else. On the strength of this
promise liberals have elaborately denied or only grudgingly accorded
politics a place in tribunals of justice, which is to say that they have
pursued a formalist ideal that, from the CLS perspective, excludes and
denigrates citizen participation-which is all that politics is."3 9
Allowing politics freely to penetrate law carries its costs, of course.
flect the deliberative process of case-deciding. Manyjudges may deny this, but it does
not follow that they stand charged with deceiving themselves in so doing.
137 Rawls has recently adopted the view that voting should not be an expression of
personal preference, or even of one's personal view of moral truth. Rather, voting
should be an interpretive act, expressing to one's fellows a "public reason" that is
grounded in (and only in) a "public conception of justice" worked up from certain
ideas "implicit in the public culture of a democratic society." RAwLs, supra note 10, at
15, 219-20. Rawls applies this "duty of civility," as he calls it, to "constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice," and leaves open the possibility that it likewise
applies to all public questions. Id. at 215, 217-18. Rawls is thus prepared to apply
clamps to politics that other liberal theorists have preferred to apply only to law. The
irony is that Rawls thereby smears from the politics side the very law/politics distinction that other liberal theorists have labored, from the law side as it were, to keep
clear.
138 Lawrence Solum has argued that CLS incoherently claims that legal doctrine is
both impotent-because indeterminate-and disempowering-because it conceals
possibilities. To have the power to convey a false sense of necessity is, obviously, Solum says, to have a power. See Solum, supra note 13. But, in answer to Solum, suppose
a case in which the law disguised all but one pair of possibilities, between which the
law was undecided. This would be a case in which one could quite coherently point
out that the law is disempowering, insofar as it conceals other possibilities, and impotent to decide between the two it allows to be revealed.
139 1 disagree with Frederick Kellogg's assessment that CLS calls for "increasing the
political role of lawyers and the legal priesthood." See Kellogg, supra note 58, at 18,
56. To the contrary, CLS is better understood as calling for a decrease in the political
role of lawyers and a coordinate increase in the participation of lay people. See, e.g.,
Clare Dalton, Book Review, 6 HARv. WoMAN's L.J. 241 (1983) (reviewing THE POLI-rIGS OF LAw (David Kairys ed., 1982)). For CLS, the degree of "politicality" of the
lawyer's role is a function of the degree of lawyer domination of what is ultimately a
political process, and has nothing to do with the degree to which lawyers acknowledge
the political dimension of what they do.
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Predictability would be sacrificed were law as open to "fresh assessments of the moral merits" as politics must be. Abstraction is good for
the law to the extent that it stops the time-wasting reopening of issues
and protects the despised by ignoring their unloved traits. But the
desirability of abstraction in law is both contestable and at odds with
well-settled legal doctrines, e.g., equity, fact-pleading, and jury factfinding, to name a few. Of course Altman is right that one of the aims
of law is to abstract, to regularize, to facilitate predictability; but the
law also contains its counterprinciples-but that should be familiar by
now.
Altman recognizes that CLS values political activity more highly
than liberals, and that political philosophy cannot be neutral on the
issue of how much political involvement is desirable. Although the
rule of law restricts the benevolent possibilities of state action, liberals
hang their hat on the (entirely reasonable) surmise that the risks of
malevolent consequences if the rule of law is abandoned or relaxed
are greater. Altman is right that CLS has to show that opening legal
institutions to overt moral and political discourse and to greater lay
participation will enhance the overall legitimacy of the state. But what
should be emphasized is that this is the burden CLS has yet to carry.1 4 °
CLS bears no further burden of discrediting the stubbornly persistent
Lockean dream of a heaven of preexisting legal rights and duties.
That burden had already been met, in fact, as long ago as the 1920s.
VI.

RELAXING THE

LocKEAiN STRICTURE

Unless there are specific legal rights and duties preexisting a
judge's decision, which are there for her to get right or get wrong,
the legitimacy of that decision is problematic from the Lockean
standpoint. This Lockean stricture on legitimate state coercion is a
commitment so deep that it is least acknowledged even where it
most dominates liberal theorizing.14 The problematic of modern
liberal jurisprudence is best understood as an effort to reconcile
Legal Realist insights with the Lockean stricture. Dworkin's theorizing, for example, only makes sense as an effort to fill Hart's gaps
in the law with something satisfying the Lockean stricture.
At this point (if not earlier) it should appear that the Lockean
insistence upon preexisting legal rights and duties may be what involves liberal theory in its "endless moves of confession and avoid140 By speaking of CLS's burden of persuasion, I do not mean to imply that the
liberal position is entitled to any presumption of correctness. For an enlightening
discussion of the rhetoric of "burdens," see GAsIUNS, supra note 11.
141 See BURTON, supra note 14, at 165-85; Kress, supra note 8, at 285-95.
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ance." 14 2 The question that must be asked is whether Locke's
stricture is inseparable from the liberal theory of legitimation, or
whether it can safely be modified without offending core liberal
values.
The Lockean stricture serves to assure that the legal regime to
which the citizen is subjected is one to which she might give her
assent. It serves to assure, in Jeremy Waldron's term, the transparency of power to reason.1 43 With its insistence upon preexisting
legal rights and duties, the stricture serves to ease the transition
from an hypothesized and highly abstract act of assent by all to the
"basic structure" of society, 1" to the concrete but often distressingly unexpected bringing of coercive power to bear upon an unsuccessful litigant. Locke's stricture insists that there must be an
answer to the loser's demand to know "By what right?" and the
right specified will render transparent what might otherwise have
seemed, at least to the loser, to be nothing better than institution1 4
alized robbery. 1
The Lockean stricture is, thus, one way of satisfying the Enlightenment demand for transparency. But it is a way that leads us
into the perplexities discussed above. And it is not the only way to
assure the transparency that is the essence of political legitimacy.
The transparency that is necessary to a decent and legitimate state
need not and cannot be transparency "all the way down"; for if it
were then no market economy could be legitimate, nor could any
state that allowed inscrutable natural advantages (e.g., strength, talent, intelligence) to affect the distribution of goods.
An adequate transparency might exist only at a more abstract
supra note 40, at 14.
143 See Waldron, supra note 12, at 146-50.
144 Reconsider here Rawls's statement of the "Principle of Liberal Legitimacy:"
[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of
which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.
RAwLS, supra note 10, at 217 (emphasis added). The Lockean stricture serves to specify the meaning of the phrase "in accordance with" in Rawls's formula.
145 1 will assume for present purposes that it is fair to say that adjudication, as a
species of state power, is essentially coercive. This assumption is so easily made, and
so generally, that I suspect it warrants closer scrutiny. If, following Robert Nozick, the
analysis of coercion requires us to distinguish (coercive) threats and (noncoercive)
offers, and if this distinction essentially involves reference to a presumed moral "baseline," then an explanation and defense of one's choice of baseline would be a necessary prelude to showing that state power is inherently coercive. Compare Robert
Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST
NAGEL 440 (S. Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) with KELMAN, supra note 1, at 22-23.
This is a project for another day, however.
142 UNGER,
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level, as a defender of a free or mixed market would claim. The
outcomes of the play of market forces are capable of being made
tolerably intelligible "to every last individual,"1 4 6 but not in terms of
the deliberations of a personalized agency, nor in terms that would
permit any prediction of what those outcomes will be. Similarly,
the workings of the Anglo-American judicial system are "wellknown and available for public apprehension and scrutiny"14 7
and are to that extent transparent-but this is not to say that the
system is capable of being comprehended from a synoptic, Herculean viewpoint, for it need not be and is not.
As an alternative to the Lockean approach, an adequate transparency might consist in an openness of state processes to participation as well as inspection-which is precisely what
"programmatic" CLS urges. This conception could be advanced by
repudiating the mounting pressures to curtail the role of juries in
private law actions. 4 It could be advanced by taking steps to curb
the domination of electoral campaigns by private wealth. 49 It
could be advanced by restructuring electoral mechanisms to guarantee minority representation.1 5 0 It could be advanced by forcing
bureaucratic decisionmaking into the open.15 1 It could be advanced by recognizing the state's affirmative duty to educate its citizens. 152 And so on; the list is neither short nor unfamiliar.
Mixed and perhaps other conceptions of transparency are possible as well. The Lockean stricture expresses a conception of
transparency that cannot and need not be excluded, just as it cannot and need not exclude all others. It would be better for liberals
and their critics to come to see that their debate is centrally about
their competing conceptions of transparency, and only peripherally about how much indeterminacy there is in the law. Altman is
right that the issue of the optimal degree of law's openness to politics is one of contention between liberals and CLS; what Altman
obscures is that this is not a peripheral issue of political philosophy,
but is central to legal theory as well.
Altman leaves generous hints that he is ready to back away
Waldron, supra note 12, at 128.
Id. at 146.
See Catharine Wells, Tort Law as CorrectiveJustice: A PragmaticJustificationforJury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990).
149 Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
150 See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theoy of
Black Electoral Success, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1077 (1991).
151 Cf Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FCC v. rMr World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
152 Cf San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
146
147
148
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from some of the more rigid construals of liberalism. For example,
in reply to Hayek's claim that the practices of the modern administrative state are irreconcilable with the rule of law, Altman suggests
that the "rule of law" idea must be formulated at a "level of abstrac-

tion" not tied to specific "institutional detail[

].,,153

Thus, Altman

reasons, liberal theory can accommodate adjudication of legal
rights by tribunals not constituted in precisely the way law courts
are. But, similarly, liberal theory gains considerable flexibility, and
plausibility, if the preexisting legal rights and duties it insists upon
are conceived at a level of abstraction not tied to the notion of
logically sufficient or ideally rational conditions, or to Fuller's
"eight ways." 15 4
Yet, if the notion of legal accountability is pitched to too high
a level of abstraction it is almost vacuously satisfied-as if we were
to say, for example, that the only concrete right a litigant brings to
court is a right to a "good faith" decision. 155 What we want to know
is: What are the hallmarks of a good faith decision?1 56 But what
crucially matters is the perspective from which we ask this question.
If our standpoint is that of the agent who wishes to know, ex ante,
what the legal consequences of the various options open to her will
be, then what we will want is an answer in terms closely approximating concrete legal rights and duties cast in the mold of Fuller's
eight ways. But if our perspective1 57 is that of the citizen, who
wishes to know hypothetically whether an erroneous order commands any moral force, then we may have to be satisfied with a
more general account.
Have to be satisfied, that is, unless we are prepared to set sail
on a sea of doubt as to whether any legal mistake can ever be binding. 15 For, another reason to abandon the Lockean stricture is
that it cannot easily be squared with our considered intuitions
See ALTMAN, supra note 3, at 52-53.
See LON FULLER, THE MORALrr OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969). Altman compactly
expresses the eight ways "to" make law: "In a typical liberal account of the rule of law
... norms [are required] to be (1) general in scope, (2) made public, (3) applied
prospectively, (4) clear in meaning, (5) duly enacted . . ., (6) possible to obey, (7)
stable .... and (8) enforced in a manner consonant with their meaning." ALTMAN,
supra note 3, at 26.
155 See, e.g., Philip Soper's discussion of Raz's "dependence thesis" in PHILIP SOPER,
A THEORY OF LAw 119-22, 133-43 (1984), and Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim
153
154

of Authority, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AiF. 209, 221-24 (1989).
156

Steven Burton tackles this question in his recent book,

IN GOOD FAITH (1992).
157 Other perspectives

STEVEN BURTON, JUDGING

are relevant as well. See Steven Burton, Law, Obligation, and a
Good Faith Claim ofJustice, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1956 (1985).
158 Cf Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 1, 15 (1985).
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about legal obligation. We believe that there exists a legal duty to
obey an incorrect judicial decision, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. 59 If such a duty exists, however, it cannot be
drawn from the narrowest set of preexisting legal rights and duties
that determine what the correct legal outcome would have been;
for that set entails that the loser ought to have won. Rather, the
loser's duty must be grounded in reasons that concern the virtues
of the wider system ofjustice. But if such reasons can legitimately
command obedience to an erroneous legal order, then the Lockean stricture simply cannot be true; that is, it cannot state without
qualification a necessary condition of legitimate state coercion.
A legitimate judicial result need not have been logically foreordained or be somehow uniquely reachable by an idealized reasoner; what matters is whether the result and results of its kind
form part of a system that is open to reason. This is the wisdom in
Alexander Bickel's rendering of political legitimacy in terms of a
capacity to generate consent, 160 and in recent liberal theorists' elevation of transparency to preeminence among institutional virtues.
Sometimes parties' rights are simply enforced in court, and sometimes they simply emerge. As long as we all understand that, and
are at least open to being persuaded that this reality is as legitimate
as it is useful and unavoidable, then the rule of law-call it the
liberalrule of law, if you like-is something we all can live with and
work on.
VII.

Is TRANSPARENCY DISPENSABLE?

Two liberal legal theorists, Ken Kress and Steven Burton, have
correctly emphasized that "indeterminacy matters because legitimacy matters,"161 and both have called for alternatives to the stan-

dard formalist answers to the problem of giving a liberal account of
adjudicative legitimacy. 'But Kress and Burton have pursued these
insights in importantly different ways. Kress has cast doubt upon
the role of consent in liberal political theorizing generally, while
Burton has outlined a "contextual" approach to legitimating judicial lawmaking. A brief outline of their respective approaches will
show how they stand in contrast to CLS, and the direction that further discussion will likely take.
Formalist theories of adjudication (of which coherentist theories are a species) enhance adjudicative legitimacy only to the ex159 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
160 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, TiE MORALrr OF CONSENT 15-18
161 Kress, supra note 8, at 285.

(1975).
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tent that they logically tie judging to something else whose
legitimacy is less problematic, such as majoritarian legislation.
Majoritarian legislation is supposed here to be less problematic because it is assumed to more closely reflect the consent of the governed, which liberal theory treats as the ultimate source of political
legitimacy. The supposed possibility of embedding adjudicative legitimacy within a more general consent theory has been critically
examined by Ken Kress.
Kress, seconding Burton, rightly deplores theorizing that "implicitly assumes that the only way judicial decisions could be legitimate is if they rigidly follow... [legislative] provisions, themselves
legitimated by consent.... [thus implicitly excluding] the possibility of other ways of legitimating adjudication."1 62 By "legitimacy,"
Kress means what the term means "in classical political philosophy:
If a judicial decision is legitimate, it provides a prima facie moral
obligation for citizens to obey the decision."' 6 3 But he argues that
indeterminacy 64 -or "moderate" indeterminacy anyway' 6 5 -has
no serious consequences for the legitimacy of judging. 6 6 This is
because each of the major liberal accounts of the duty to obey the
1 67
law succeed or fail whether law is determinate or not.
Consent theories of political obligation, for example, fail to
support a general, prima facie moral obligation to obey law qua
law, and fail whether or not the law is determinate. Consent theories fail, in Kress's view, for the simple but sufficient reason that no
such consent has been generally given. Other efforts to support a
general duty to obey the law, such as Rawls's duty to support just
institutions, similarly succeed (or fail) irrespective of any supposition of the degree of indeterminacy within the law. Kress concludes that a "moderate indeterminacy [claim], even if true, has
little or no consequences for political legitimacy because only
rarely will anyone's obligations depend upon whether the law is
determinate."' 68
Although Kress is not ready to "conclusively conclude[ ],9
that indeterminacy is irrelevant to legitimacy, he suggests that CLS
ponder the possibility that it is:
162 Id. at 288.
163 Id. at 285.
164 See id. at 289-90, 292, 294-95.
165
166

See id. at 283-84, 293, 337.
See id. at 295.

167 See id.
168 Id. at 337.
169 Id.
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Insofar as critical legal scholarship accepts the postulate that the
state is legitimated by the consent of the governed, it fails to go
for the jugular and enfeebles its critique. In this way, it is insufficiently radical. It should regroup and address the
legitimacy of
70
the state and of adjudication at its foundation.'
It is not hard to understand why CLS might hesitate to go for this
particular jugular, however radical doing so might be. CLS does not
want to repudiate the Enlightenment project of making the operations of power plain "to every last individual." On the contrary, CLS
generally understands itself as more genuinely devoted to this ideal
than contemporary liberals are.
Kress leaves hanging the question: What account of legitimacy
are we to give, if the consent of the governed is not the final appeal?
As he acknowledges, his objections to a consent theory of obligation
do not necessarily frustrate a consent account of legitimacy, for the
two are distinct, as Jeremy Waldron has pointed out. Even so, Kress
tends to disparage the connection between legitimacy and transparency. He contends, for example, that what affects only the "perceived" as against the "actual" legitimacy of the state is "foreign" to his
main purposes and thus "irrelevant."1 71 But an analysis of the perception citizens have of the functioning of the legal order is of the highest relevance to the issue whether that order is transparent to them,
and thus is crucial to what Kress presumably has agreed to be the central issue, i.e., whether the degree of indeterminacy exhibited in a lib1 72
eral legal system is compatible with its legitimacy.
Steven Burton, anticipating Kress's suggestion that someone "address the legitimacy of the state and of adjudication at its foundation,"' 7 3 has announced "the death of formalism" and called for us to
enter "a post-formalist world" in which the Lockean stricture "is
neither a model of legitimacy, a standard for criticism, nor an ideal to
be mimicked imperfectly."' 7 4 In a post-formalist world "the meaning
of legitimacy shifts from a demand for antecedent legitimating foundations for each particular judicial decision to a demand for a legal
and political system that, on the whole, enjoys and merits the allegiance of the people. " 1 75 For the reasons given earlier in this essay, I
170 Id. Cf Joseph Raz's "normal justification thesis," which legitimates authority in
terms of its aptitude for assessing better than agents themselves how agents might best
fulfill their own aims. RAz, supra note 18, at 53.
171 Kress, supra note 8, at 284-85.
172 Cf. Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1538 (counting "determiniles").
173 BURTON, supra note 14, at 295.
174 Id. at 199.

175

Id.
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am in agreement with Burton on this point, and I would hazard that
most of those allied with CLS would likewise find themselves in sympathy. From the "contextual" perspective thus reached, the issue at once
becomes: What account to give of a legal and political system that
"enjoys and merits" popular support?
Burton sketches out the "contextual meaning of legitimacy" in a
way that he believes gives due regard both to the need for "the consent of the people . . . in some sense" and for rights-like curbs to
majoritarian tyranny.17 6 He eschews any general theory and confines
himself to building the more modest position that "[c]ertain highly
stable characteristics of U.S. society... [make its] institution of adjudication ... legitimate because it contributes to the legitimacy of the
U.S. legal and political system as a whole." '7 7
There are two steps to Burton's argument. The first is the claim
that "[t] he role of the legal community in legal reasoning distinguishes
adjudication from political lawmaking or decision by personal value
preference."1 7 The legal community, Burton explains, carries on an
"extended conversation" which, unlike political conversation, centrally concerns order and justice1 79 and often attains a degree of "social objectivity" necessary to making a net addition to the overall
legitimacy of the U.S. political system. 8 0 The second step is the claim
that the dominant role of the legal community in governing adjudication is appropriate. To support the second step, Burton points to
"three stable features" that legitimate the special role of the legal community: (1) maintaining control over the state's use of coercive force
practically requires a delegation of authority by the citizenry to an expert legal elite; (2) the legal community is a more effective guardian
of minority rights than majoritarian politics can be; and (3) order and
justice generally are better served by according a special role to the
legal community within a general majoritarian political framework.
I will not undertake an extended critique of Burton's position
here. But I will note two striking things about it. The first is its refusal
to bracket substantive issues of political legitimacy, and in this respect
it stands in sharp contrast to Altman's. The second is its acknowledgement that law and politics are, from the standpoint of legitimacy, to be
distinguished with reference to the special role of an exclusive com176

Id. at 199-202.

177

Id. at 204.

178

Id. at 204.

Burton reminds us that there are other differences distinctive of the legal community, of course, such as its case-orientation and its collective disposition to take
legal results very seriously. See id. at 210-14.
179

180

Id. at 209-10.
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munity (the lawyers) whose special position exists because of its special devotion to certain values-order and justice-and its special
aptitude for informal reasoning about them. This suggests that Burton's conception of transparency, like Altman's and like Kress's, does
not heavily draw upon any very active part in the "legal conversation"
for the average citizen except as an otherwise passive bearer (or receptacle) of rights and liabilities. That this conception of legitimacy is
arguable is obvious;"' what has not been obvious is that this conception is-essentially, and not peripherally-what the argument between CLS and the "straight" legal world has been about all along.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Enlightenment ideal of transparency informs both modern liberal jurisprudence and its CLS critique. Transparency is a
complex ideal, however, presenting both a volitional and a rationalistic aspect, asJeremy Waldron has described. 8 2 It is volitional in
its emphasis upon actual, free, individual assent as a necessary condition of the state's legitimacy. It is rationalistic in its focus upon
the understanding of presumptively equal and idealized-and to
that extent, fungible-reasoners. While the voluntaristic aspect of
transparency grounds the legitimacy of the state in the actual assent of the governed, its rationalistic aspect stands legitimacy instead on the ground of what an ideally constituted reasoner would
assent to.
Modern liberal jurisprudence has tended to emphasize the rationalistic rather than the volitional meaning of transparency. The
rationalistic conception locates consent at an abstract level, and attempts to legitimate adjudication by postulating a rigorous logical
passage from this level to the concrete level of particular judicial
decisions. This logical passage is supposed to be guaranteed by
neutral legal reasoning, and its criterion of success is what I have
called the Lockean stricture: a legitimate judicial decision is one
that enforces preexisting legal rights and duties.
Beginning with the vogue of Legal Realism in the 1920s, the
rationalistic picture has faced repeated challenges even as it has
struggled with difficulties revealed to itself in working through its
181 SeeTushnet, supra note 15, at 1533 (recounting the early CLS feeling that Llewellyn had betrayed Legal Realism by reinscribing formalism in "the 'situation sense' of
the lawyering class") (citing Charles Clark & David Trubek, The Creative Role of the
Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition,71 YALE LJ. 255 (1961)). See
also David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1992).
182 See Waldron, supra note 12, at 134-35, 140.
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own problematic. These challenges have drawn liberal responses
that tend either to hypothesize a superhuman rationality-as in
Dworkin's case-or to resolve the rationality of law into the ineffable habits and competence of a specialized community-as in the
cases of Altman, Burton, and Fiss.
CLS theorists have viewed these responses as mystifications unworthy of the Enlightenment insistence that "every last individual"
is owed ajustification of state power that is to be understood by her
"individual mind, not by the tradition or sense of a community,"188
much less the sense of the legal community. Moreover, CLS has
insisted that the Enlightenment understanding of society as an artifact requires that the individual be actively engaged in the construction of the state to the greatest extent feasible, if not "all the
way down." In these respects CLS is governed by the voluntaristic
meaning of transparency.
The tension between the rationalistic and the voluntaristic aspects of transparency is evident enough. As I have argued, neither
liberal legal theory nor its CLS opposition is likely to triumph by
demonstrating that its favored aspect of transparency is all we
need. What will emerge from the current debate is at least a deepened appreciation of the complexity and breadth of the value both
sides share, if not a best, consensus theory that defines the ideal
mix of the several conceptions of transparency that we have. But
this prediction optimistically assumes that both sides will begin to
see that transparency, not indeterminacy, is what their debate has
really been about all along.

183

Id. at 135. Cf

KELMAN,

supra note 1, at 14.

